Abstract
Gershon and Green’s edited volume Manifold Anthropology replaces bounded institutions with overlapping social orders. Yet the volume never asks if social orders are the primary unit of analysis. This review asks a sharper question: whose problem is the boundary between institutions? When viewed closely, distinctions between “family” and “market,” or “law” and “sport,” or “religion” and “economy” are not the actually the participants’ problem at all. It’s the anthropologist’s problem. Close reading of the Airbnb ethnography shows how a seamless living coordination is turned by the anthropologist into a problematic oscillation between market logic and family logic, when something else entirely is at stake. The volume’s strongest chapters already demonstrate that institutional classifications become consequential only situationally. An alternative starting point is proposed: living coordination across embodiment, relations, dwelling, materials and symbols. We risk losing sight of what matters to people if we start with our own analytic categories as baseline ontology.
I. Introduction: An Airbnb Guest, a Wrong Apartment, and Two Supposed Social Orders
Late one night a guest returns to the apartment he has rented through Airbnb. He has been drinking, and he tries to let himself into the wrong flat, one floor above his own. When the key fails he telephones his host, who is asleep and does not answer. He spends the night in a hotel. The next morning he asks the host to reimburse him, and she refuses: guests who come back late, she explains, are expected to let themselves in with their keys, just as her own children do. Both parties then turn to Airbnb's conflict resolution service. Nurit Bird-David reports this episode in her contribution to Manifold Anthropology (pp. 242–243), and on the face of it, it is a minor but perfectly intelligible dispute about practical responsibility.
Bird-David reads it differently. In the interpretation that immediately follows the host's comparison with her children, she presents the incident as an encounter between two social orders: the guest, she argues, invoked a market rationale, and the host a familial one (p. 243). The reader is invited to see, in a single morning's quarrel over a hotel bill, the collision of two of the great organizing domains of modern social theory.
It is worth slowing down at the inferential step. Why should the host's comparison with her children show that she understands herself to be acting within a familial order? What she says is that people who hold working keys should let themselves in. That expectation applies to children, but it applies equally to friends staying over, to colleagues sharing a rented house and to paying guests, and its force does not depend on kinship at all. If anything, the comparison identifies a practical expectation that remains constant across different relationships, which is the opposite of marking a boundary between them. The guest's demand for reimbursement is equally underdetermined. He is contesting who should bear the cost of a failed night's accommodation, and nothing in the request shows that he is speaking on behalf of the market as a social order. The two parties are disagreeing about who was responsible for what happened, and there is no evidence that they disagree about what kind of relationship they have.
The immediate problem, then, is a failed coordination involving a key, an apartment, a sleeping host, an intoxicated guest and contested obligations. The more interesting question is why an anthropologist should transform it into a confrontation between family and market. This review essay is organized around a single question that the episode makes unusually visible: whose problem is maintaining the distinction between family and market? Three answers are possible, and they are not equivalent findings. The distinction may be a problem for the participants, something they notice, worry about and defend. It may exert practical effects without ever becoming a conscious concern, in the way that a tax category or a zoning rule shapes lives that never reflect on it. Or the problem may arise chiefly from the analyst's classificatory apparatus, which finds two orders because it went looking for them.
The question is older than manifold anthropology. When Malinowski set out to determine whether the Kula was economic or ceremonial exchange, he too began with an inherited contrast and asked how the practices he had observed related to it. Neither Malinowski nor Bird-David first establishes why sorting activities in this fashion should have explanatory priority. My argument is that this is a recurring problem in anthropology, the conversion of an analytical classification into an apparent problem of living coordination, and that Manifold Anthropology is an unusually rich place to study it, because the volume contains both chapters that perform the conversion and chapters whose ethnography quietly undoes it.
II. What Manifold Anthropology Proposes, and Why It Matters
Any critique of this book must begin by acknowledging what it achieves. Gershon and Green start from a dissatisfaction that many anthropologists will recognize: the discipline's long dependence on bounded entities such as culture, society and community, each imagined as a whole within which people live and from which their conduct can be explained. Against this, the editors argue that people inhabit overlapping, partially connected and sometimes competing social orders. These arrangements are neither fully coherent nor fully separated but remain porous, contested and incompletely integrated, and much of social life consists in working across them.
The volume brings together two related lines of thought. Gershon's work on porous social orders (Gershon 2019) encourages anthropologists to examine how people manage several repertoires of norms, expectations, roles and institutional procedures at once, and how the edges of those repertoires leak into one another. Green's work on crosslocations (Green et al. 2024) challenges the assumption that a place has one stable location or belongs to a single spatial order. Locations emerge instead through overlapping regimes of classification, jurisdiction, infrastructure, movement and valuation, so that a stretch of coastline can be at once a national border, an ecosystem, a tourist destination and a migration route. Together, these approaches replace bounded totalities with multiple, intersecting and unfinished orders.
This is a real advance. The model draws attention to contradictions within institutions, to discrepancies between official classifications and actual practice, to the travel of technologies and organizational forms, and to the possibility that people coordinate successfully without sharing identical understandings. It also dismantles a powerful and rarely examined assumption, namely that the apparent coherence of an institution must reflect a corresponding coherence in the lives of those who participate in it. The fifteen chapters extend the approach across an impressive range: religion, law, race, violence, economic activity, public policy, agriculture, taxation, environmental governance and industrial animal production.
The editors are also careful. They do not claim that everyone is always consciously managing social orders. Their introduction acknowledges that multiplicity is recognized with varying degrees of explicitness, and their coda emphasizes coordination that succeeds despite incomplete agreement. These qualifications matter, and a fair review must register them.
The question is whether the framework has developed an adequate procedure for distinguishing between the existence of different institutional arrangements and the practical relevance of their boundaries. Manifold anthropology begins by asking what changes when we assume that people inhabit multiple social orders. Why should that premise organize the ethnography? Even if many historically stabilized arrangements coexist, it does not follow that their coexistence is what participants are primarily concerned with. There is also a prior difficulty. What counts as a distinct social order? Does every difference in norms or expectations establish one? How does the analyst distinguish several orders from shifting expectations within one continuous coordination? A household that is quiet after ten at night and noisy at breakfast does not obviously contain two orders, and a household that also takes paying guests may or may not. These questions are not answered by showing that different institutional repertoires can be identified, because identification is cheap: almost any activity can be described as drawing on more than one repertoire.
The book's central vulnerability can therefore be stated in a sentence. Manifold anthropology successfully questions the boundedness of social orders but does not consistently question the explanatory priority it assigns to social orders themselves. The result is a theory that can remain organized around institutional classification even while it rejects institutional closure.
III. From Malinowski to Manifold Anthropology: The Problem of Portable Classifications
The methodological issue has a longer history, and I have traced one formative episode of it in a study of Malinowski's Argonauts of the Western Pacific (Ecks 2026). The connection I want to draw concerns a continuity of analytical procedure, and I am not suggesting that Malinowski and the contributors to this volume hold the same theory.
Malinowski's ethnography of the Kula describes voyages, exchange partnerships, canoe building and carving, danger at sea, magic, obligations, personal rivalry, bodily exertion and the movement of highly valued shell valuables around a ring of islands. The account is considerably richer than the proposition for which it became famous, that the Kula constitutes ceremonial rather than economic exchange. Malinowski did not invent every distinction he used. Trobrianders themselves differentiate Kula from gimwali, the haggling barter of ordinary goods. The difficulty lies in what he did with such local differences, which was to transform particular distinctions in practice into general classificatory oppositions whose comparative relevance remained insufficiently examined. His well-known classification of gifts, payments and exchanges arranges transfers along a continuum from pure gift to trade pure and simple. The continuum appears to acknowledge complexity, but its endpoints are never challenged, and every Trobriand transfer is thereby located by reference to a contrast that was brought to the islands rather than found there.
The earlier study describes this as the difference between faithfully recording an activity and establishing which of its features deserve to organize comparison. It proposes four evidential distinctions that must be kept apart: observed conduct, participant articulation, analytical classification, and causal or functional generalization. Each is a different kind of claim, and each requires a different kind of warrant. Ethnographic error rarely occurs within any one of them and usually occurs in the passage between them, when what was warranted at one level is silently carried into the next.
The relevance to manifold anthropology is immediate. In the Airbnb chapter we observe people arranging accommodation, discussing household access, providing care, eating together and occasionally disputing obligations. That is observed conduct, sometimes accompanied by participant articulation. The analyst then classifies the conduct in terms of family and market. Finally, the classifications are used to support a general theory of movement between social orders. The problem lies in the two passages: from observation to classification, and from classification to explanatory generalization.
A name for what goes wrong in these passages is conceptual overcommensuration. It occurs when a classificatory distinction is made to cover activities whose relevant differences exceed, or have little connection with, the distinction itself. Put more simply, it is the mistaking of a possible comparison for an explanatory one. The categories may be recognizable and convenient. They may even illuminate some features of an activity. The error lies in treating their applicability as evidence of their explanatory priority. Family and market can be applied to almost any Airbnb stay, just as gift and commodity can be applied to almost any Trobriand transfer, and that ease of application is precisely what should make us suspicious.
This leads to a simple methodological question, one that Malinowski could have asked of the Kula and Bird-David could have asked of Airbnb: what would we discover if we did not begin by deciding which kind of institution or social order an activity belongs to? The answer is likely to be less a new and superior classification than a more faithful account of what people are doing and what is at stake for them.
IV. Airbnb and the Manufacture of a Boundary Problem
Bird-David's chapter, "Multiple Social Orders in Airbnb Homestays" (pp. 229–246), repays the closest reading because of an unusual feature of its genesis. She reports that she completed her fieldwork before encountering the manifold anthropology framework, and then reanalysed her material through the distinction between family and market. This is a legitimate procedure, provided that the resulting interpretation earns its claims from the evidence. It also makes the contribution of the framework especially visible, because we can see what the ethnography looked like before the framework arrived and ask what the framework added.
The problem established in advance
The chapter's guiding questions concern how hosts and guests navigate family and market relations, how they reconcile codes of intimacy and formality, and how they negotiate the differences between commercial and domestic arrangements. The conclusions are already built into the formulation. What needs to be established is that the differences in how people behave toward one another are meaningfully organized by a family/market opposition, which is a much stronger claim than that people behave differently in different circumstances. That money changes hands establishes a commercial arrangement. That people sleep in a family home establishes a domestic setting. Neither fact shows that participants experience the combination as a problem of reconciling distinct social orders. A homestay is from the start an arrangement in which a fee buys temporary access to a household, and there is no a priori reason to think that the people who enter into it experience that composition as a tension rather than simply as what a homestay is.
Ordinary accommodation as continuous coordination
Much of the chapter's best material concerns keys, bedrooms, bathrooms, shared kitchens and household schedules. Hosts explain which spaces guests may use. Guests adapt to unfamiliar arrangements. Sometimes permissions are discussed explicitly, and sometimes they are worked out through ordinary interaction, a closed door here, a shared breakfast there. This is good ethnography, attentive to the small adjustments by which strangers learn to live in the same rooms. But these negotiations need not involve movement between family and market. Someone who asks whether they may use a bathroom is generally trying to find out whether they may use the bathroom. Questions of access can, of course, become questions of privacy, property or contractual entitlement, and when that happens the ethnographer should notice it. The crucial task is to determine when it happens. The presence of several possible classifications is no evidence that participants are considering any of them.
Hospitality, companionship and the attribution of family relations
Bird-David also describes hosts providing meals, showing affection, talking at length with guests and sustaining friendships long after a stay has ended. She treats these activities as evidence of movement toward family-like relations. The most striking example concerns a Malaysian host who cared for a guest's daughter after the mother was taken to hospital. What is actually happening here? A mother becomes ill. Her daughter needs care. Another person responds to that need. This is practical care in the face of bodily vulnerability, a moment of interrecursive being-with in which each party's conduct is shaped by the other's responses. It may lead to lasting affection, and participants may understandably reach for family metaphors to describe it. None of this requires the claim that they have crossed from a market order into a family order. Indeed, the episode is revealing precisely because the practical need is so evident and the classificatory question so remote. A child needed looking after, and whether looking after her belonged to the domain of kinship or of commerce is unlikely to have occurred to anyone at the hospital.
The same holds for invitations to meals and for friendships that outlast the stay. People can be hospitable to paying guests without treating them as kin, and friendships can grow out of commercial encounters without their emergence being experienced as a problem of institutional boundaries. Participants sometimes use kinship comparisons themselves, and such expressions are valuable ethnographic evidence of how people articulate particular relationships. They do not, however, establish that the practical problem facing those people is how to reconcile family and market.
The midnight dispute, step by step
Return now to the opening episode and separate four things that the chapter runs together. First, there is the immediate coordination: the guest was expected to have access to his accommodation and had been given the means to it. Second, there is the disruption: he tried to unlock the wrong apartment and could not get in. Third, there are the competing articulations: he demanded reimbursement, while the host held him responsible for using his key correctly. Fourth, there is the institutional response: both appealed to Airbnb. Nothing in this sequence shows that the host regards the guest as a family member, even temporarily. Her reference to her children is an analogy about independent access, and it says nothing about the kind of relationship she has with paying guests.
The most consequential inferential mistake in the chapter is to treat the source of an analogy as the source of an obligation. The host draws her analogy from household experience because household experience is where she has most often seen people come home late with keys. The obligations at issue, however, arise from the accommodation arrangement and from whatever expectations were communicated when it was made. An analogy can illustrate an expectation, but it cannot establish where the expectation comes from, still less the existence of a familial social order. Likewise, the guest's demand for compensation shows that money and contractual expectations matter to him, without showing that he understands himself to be defending the boundary of a market order.
There is also an evidential limitation that the chapter does not address. The episode is reported retrospectively, and by the host. The guest's own account is not presented. The author nevertheless attributes a distinct social rationale to each party, including the one whose voice is absent. The conclusion should be restrained but clear: Bird-David's interpretation is possible as an analogy, but the evidence does not establish it as an explanation of the dispute.
The exception that supposedly proves the rule
Bird-David describes the midnight dispute as the only case she heard about that involved an argument over money. This is a remarkable finding, and its implications run against the chapter's thesis. The near-total absence of such disputes suggests that hosts and guests ordinarily coordinate perfectly adequately without articulating, let alone defending, a distinction between commercial and familial relationships. Yet the general interpretation remains that they continuously and skilfully oscillate between social orders.
What evidence would count against that interpretation? If smooth coordination is taken as proof of successful oscillation, and disagreement as proof that the orders sometimes collide, then nearly every possible observation confirms the theory. A framework that cannot be embarrassed by its data has a problem of explanatory testability, whatever its other merits.
The chapter is valuable precisely because its observational material supports a more parsimonious account than the framework permits. Its subject is the variable development of practical relationships among people who have entered a paid accommodation arrangement: some remain cordial strangers, some become friends, a very few fall out. Whether family and market become relevant classifications in any of these trajectories should be an ethnographic finding, reported where it occurs, rather than the framework through which every interaction is read.
V. When Boundaries Really Do Become Problems
If the argument stopped there, it would be unfair to the volume. Several chapters demonstrate that institutional classifications can become matters of considerable practical consequence, and these cases clarify the argument rather than undermine it. They show what it looks like when the relevance of a boundary is established by the ethnography instead of being presupposed by it.
Douzina-Bakalaki: food, clothing and healthcare under austerity
Phaedra Douzina-Bakalaki's chapter (pp. 31–51) examines soup kitchens, clothing banks and social clinics in northern Greece during the years of austerity. The most immediate fact is that people needed to eat, to obtain clothing and to receive medical care during an economic crisis. These are problems of metabolic remediation and material provisioning before they are problems of institutional classification. Yet Douzina-Bakalaki supplies convincing evidence that institutional resemblance sometimes matters to participants. Volunteers consciously organize soup kitchens along household lines, clothing banks along the lines of shops, and social clinics according to recognizable conventions of healthcare. Far from being categories introduced by the anthropologist, these are institutional forms that participants actively reproduce and modify.
The clothing bank offers an especially clear example. When some recipients interpret the absence of prices as permission to take unlimited quantities of clothing, volunteers become concerned about what counts as acceptable conduct. Here institutional expectations acquire practical relevance, and the ethnography shows why: resources must be distributed among many people, relations with recipients must be maintained, and the arrangement must be sustained over months. The distinction between a shop and a charity matters because it helps organize these activities, even though drawing the distinction is not what the activities are about. This is a strong example of a classification becoming consequential at a particular moment, for identifiable reasons, to identifiable people.
Rubin: rugby injury and the classification of violence
Rubin's chapter (pp. 53–79) examines how harmful bodily conduct is understood differently in sport, in games and in law. Its central example involves a rugby player whose neck was broken in a scrum and a subsequent legal judgment about the responsibility of an opposing player. Here different institutional standards plainly matter. Coaches may understand a manoeuvre as gamesmanship, while a court must decide whether it constituted intentional or reckless harm. Yet the fundamental event is a bodily injury, and the intersection of two orders is something that happens afterwards, in the effort to determine what happened and who should answer for it. The classifications become vital because they affect responsibility, liability and the interpretation of dangerous conduct. The methodological question is whether analysis should begin with multiple autonomous worlds of sport and law, or with the injury and the competing efforts to account for it. The second starting point has the advantage of keeping in view something that no reclassification can make disappear, namely a broken neck.
Demian: violence, diagnosis and institutional response
Demian (pp. 81–105) examines how violence is categorized in Papua New Guinea through warfare, gender and sorcery. This is an especially important case, because classification can determine whether particular injuries are recognized at all, what forms of protection become available, and how legal or governmental interventions proceed. Naming violence is here far more than a classificatory interest of the anthropologist. Police, state agencies, activists, victims and relatives may have consequentially different reasons to invoke or contest these categories. Even so, the categories should not displace the material and interpersonal stakes they are invoked to address: injury, fear, coercion and access to protection. A useful contrast with Bird-David emerges. In Demian's material, the relevance of the classifications is supported by their consequences for action, and not merely by their analytical availability.
Greenberg: law and the practical necessity of stabilization
Greenberg's distinction between anthropological "opening out" and legal "folding in" (pp. 149–173) provides one of the volume's strongest discussions of the productive work that classification performs. Legal actors must connect particular cases with established doctrines and precedents, which requires deliberate stabilization. Anthropologists, by contrast, tend to pursue further contextualization and to show why existing classifications are incomplete. The contrast maps closely onto the difference between situated coordination and the stabilizing work of articulation and institutionalization, which Section VIII describes as the passage through the third and fourth levels of recursivity. Greenberg's chapter adds an important refinement: legal stabilization, far from being arbitrary or merely symbolic, has practical consequences for judgments, for enforceability and for the expectations people can form about the future. The point bears emphasis, because the argument of this review is easily misread as hostile to classification as such. The question is never whether to classify, but what work a given classification performs and whose problems it addresses.
Hartikainen: religious classification and access to resources
Hartikainen's research on Candomblé temples in Salvador (pp. 175–201) offers another strong example. Religious classification, property taxation, citizenship and political access have material consequences for temple communities. Disagreements about how to gain access to state institutions concern actual bureaucratic exclusions and differing understandings of what makes political relationships effective, and they owe nothing to the anthropologist's invention. The contrast between official models of direct engagement between citizen and state and practitioners' reliance on influential intermediaries is therefore grounded in practical difficulties. What is at stake for practitioners, though, is less the maintenance of boundaries between social orders than access to recognition, tax exemptions, institutional assistance and political efficacy. The case yields a useful general principle: when classifications matter, the ethnography should establish what they enable or prevent, rather than treating their difference as an explanatory endpoint.
Taken together, these chapters show that institutional boundaries sometimes matter greatly, but that their importance is situationally produced and unevenly distributed. The existence of a boundary does not establish its priority in explaining a living coordination. What these authors do, and what the Airbnb chapter does not, is show the moment at which, and the reason for which, a boundary becomes someone's problem.
VI. Religion, Race and Projects: When Classification Becomes the Object of Attention
Four further chapters complicate the argument in productive ways. In each, a classification itself becomes an object of attention for someone, though not always for the people the theory would lead us to expect.
Tomlinson: Spiritualism and the problem of presence
Tomlinson (pp. 107–129) investigates how Spiritualism persists through mediums' demonstrations of communication with the dead. His ethnography makes it possible to distinguish the anthropologist's question, how a religious order is reproduced, from the questions participants may be trying to resolve. A medium attempting to establish contact with a deceased person is not necessarily concerned with maintaining the boundaries of Spiritualism as a social order, and the person in the congregation hoping for a message is still less likely to be. The relevant stakes may include grief, recognition, reassurance, uncertainty and whether the communication is experienced as responsive. A more specific analytical question is available here. Symbolization can coordinate with a present counterpart, refer to something absent, or re-present what is absent as present again. Is the medium referring to an absent person, attempting to make that person present again, or establishing ongoing coordination with a counterpart understood to be responsive? The answer may differ from one demonstration to the next, and it cannot be settled by classifying the activity as religious. Tomlinson deserves credit for documenting how bodily sensations, signs, moments of recognition and uncertainty enter into these encounters. The question is whether the framework of social ordering identifies what makes these encounters consequential for those who attend them.
Keck: from virus hunters to museums
Keck (pp. 131–147) brings virus hunters and museum curators into comparison through the concepts of surveillance, conservation, reservoirs and reserves, and through what he calls cynegetic power, a power modelled on the hunt. The chapter is an occasion to revisit comparative relevance directly. What exactly is being compared, and which properties of tracking, collecting, preserving and making previously unseen entities available are in fact shared? The analogy may well be illuminating, but a comparison between viral surveillance and museum curation does not of itself demonstrate a common underlying form of power. The material differences matter enormously. Microorganisms replicate and infect, collected human remains do not behave like circulating viruses, and laboratories and museums involve differently consequential practices of preservation. The point is not to reject the comparison but to specify what it helps explain, and to state its scope explicitly enough that a reader could tell when it had been exceeded.
Rosa and Orphanides: categories both imposed and contested
Rosa and Orphanides (pp. 203–227) examine racial accountability across contexts, including public responses to racist statements by Latino political figures in Los Angeles and Chicago. This is another case in which classifications plainly matter to participants and to institutions. Racial categories are historically stabilized, politically consequential and actively invoked in public disputes, and any account that treated them as mere symbolic inventions would be both analytically weak and politically careless. The question is how particular classifications become entangled with institutional power, injury, exclusion and organized political response. The chapter is valuable too for its attention to longer histories, which resists the reduction of racialized harm to isolated public statements. The significance of a racial classification cannot be established by analysing its symbolic content alone. Its consequences for embodiment, for being-with and for the multimaterial institutions of housing, policing and schooling must be investigated as well.
Rommel and Graan: the project as a portable institutional form
Rommel and Graan (pp. 247–267) examine the adaptability, portability and scalability of the project as an organizational form. The chapter matters for this review because projects show that classificatory and organizational boundaries are sometimes deliberately manufactured. A project generates budgets, timelines, reporting requirements, eligibility criteria and definitions of success, and these stabilizations can directly change what people are able to do. In the example of landscape rehabilitation, official priorities clash with villagers' understandings of valuable agricultural and ecological activity, and project categories impose consequential priorities on people who did not design them. The strongest reading of this material is that projects create practical arrangements which foreground some kinds of value while making others difficult to recognize, a more specific and more useful claim than that projects move between social orders. The questions then become: whose goals organize the project, who defines success, and what actually happens to those affected? Those questions lead naturally to the chapters on material production and environmental change.
VII. The Material World Exceeds Its Institutional Classifications
The environmental, agricultural and economic chapters constitute, after the Airbnb case, the second major body of evidence for this review's argument. Taken together, they show why institutional plurality cannot provide a sufficiently comprehensive account of what living beings are doing.
Halvorson and Reno: the Green Revolution and the stakes of agricultural intervention
Halvorson and Reno (pp. 269–293) show how particular narratives about the American Midwest contributed to the global circulation of agricultural development models. As a history of how portable representations helped legitimize interventions in distant places, the chapter is persuasive. Yet the stakes cannot be exhausted by the circulation of models. Agricultural interventions alter soils, seeds, water use, livelihoods and the very possibility of obtaining food. The concerns of policymakers, scientists, development workers and farmers need to be distinguished, since what counts as success differs among them. The successful movement of a model is not equivalent to the successful remediation of hunger or the sustaining of viable agriculture, and the chapter raises, without fully pursuing, the question of whose criteria determine whether a development intervention has succeeded. It also illustrates how an institutional stabilization can become practically dangerous when its portability is mistaken for general applicability. A model that travels well is not thereby a model that fits wherever it lands.
Blanchette: industrial pigs and the limits of classification
Blanchette (pp. 295–314) describes the production of standardized industrial pigs and the emergence of animals that the industry classifies as "off-animals." The chapter is especially valuable because it reveals how living bodies exceed the classificatory and technical systems designed to standardize them. An industrial category does more than describe an animal, since it may determine where the animal is sent, how it is handled and what happens to its body. Yet the animal's capacities, injuries, vulnerabilities and bodily variations cannot be reduced to the classification, and the off-animal is precisely the body that the system's categories failed to anticipate. This is an exceptionally strong case for distinguishing multimaterial and symbolic stabilization from embodiment. It also carries the analysis beyond the humans who administer the classifications. The pigs are living organisms whose embodied coordination and vulnerability matter even though they take no part in the human work of classification that decides their fate. The chapter therefore supports manifold anthropology's concern with multiple industrial arrangements while exposing the limits of social-order analysis, since the party whose body is most at stake in Blanchette's account participates in none of the orders through which it is classified.
Eräsaari: taxation and the practical creation of commensurability
Eräsaari's historical analysis of Fijian taxation (pp. 315–339) is centrally concerned with how different taxable units and media of assessment reorganize practical life. It demonstrates that commensuration has historical and material conditions. A tax is more than an idea, because it depends on systems of measurement, the collection of particular things, enforceable obligations and administrative arrangements. Different tax media make different activities visible and governable. What changes in production, labour, social obligation and bodily continuation when a government imposes a particular unit of assessment? Eräsaari's material allows the work performed by the tax classification to be distinguished from the wider living processes that become subject to it. A central insight follows, and it is an important safeguard against misreading the argument of this review. Classifications do not need to be actively contemplated by every participant to have real consequences. A household that never reflects on the unit by which it is assessed may nonetheless reorganize its labour around it. To ask whose problem a boundary is does not restrict anthropology to the study of conscious concerns. It requires that the consequences of a boundary be shown, whether or not anyone articulates them.
Kaartinen: a chapter that comes remarkably close to the central argument
Kaartinen's chapter (pp. 341–365) deserves special attention. He studies the work involved in turning rubber, illipe nuts and other tree products into commodities in Indonesian Borneo, and demonstrates that the relevance of particular crops varies with season, available labour, material qualities, infrastructure, prices and alternative livelihoods. His interlocutors sometimes say that a product has "no price," meaning that present conditions do not make harvesting and selling it worthwhile. More importantly, rice farming and its associated collective activities can remain central while commercial production occupies a varying and sometimes marginal place. In his conclusion Kaartinen explicitly rejects the idea that different crops are equally central to people's lives or governed by a single underlying logic.
This is an unusually strong convergence with the critique developed here. Rather than beginning with an abstract economic order, the ethnography shows people deciding what to grow, collect, keep, sell or leave alone under particular conditions. Kaartinen is himself deeply attentive to the limitations of inherited classifications, and his observation that cash crops are not equally central to the lives of those who produce them is, in effect, a finding about comparative relevance. The existence of a recognizable category, whether commodity production or a market order, does not establish its centrality to living coordination. The remaining question is why it is necessary to describe these activities as movement between economic and other social orders when the ethnography already explains their practical organization. The chapter supplies the materials for a more fundamental critique of the volume's premises than the volume itself undertakes.
Lounela, Tammisto and Wilenius: resource regimes and consequential boundaries
The final ethnographic chapter (pp. 367–393) concerns resource regimes, plantations, logging, land tenure and the connections between Southeast Asia and Oceania. Its examples demonstrate that territorial boundaries and resource classifications are far more than analytical conveniences. Plantations have gates, roads, labour arrangements, security personnel and administrative divisions, and states and companies exercise power through enforceable claims. The consequences include altered access to land, new forms of employment, environmental transformation and the reorganization of livelihoods. The question of boundaries therefore matters, but very unevenly. A company may wish to delimit land for ownership and production. Villagers may be concerned with keeping access to gardens, forests and waterways. Workers may be concerned with wages and conditions. The same boundary serves different purposes and has radically different consequences for different participants, which is exactly why the boundary between orders is too coarse a unit of analysis.
The collective achievement of these chapters is considerable. They repeatedly document how living bodies, material processes and environments exceed institutional classifications. The difficulty is that the theoretical framework sometimes redescribes this excess as the coexistence of further social orders. One must ask whether that procedure explains the evidence or simply adds another layer of classification to it.
VIII. Beyond Manifold Social Orders: Toward an Anthropology of Living Coordination
What would an alternative look like? An alternative worth having needs a different starting point rather than another classificatory apparatus for placing the same activities into different boxes. Living Value Theory, the framework from which this review is written, begins with living coordination rather than with institutions, roles, exchanges or orders: with the ongoing, multiply mediated activity through which living beings continue with and through what surrounds them. Institutions are then understood as historically stabilized arrangements within living coordination rather than as its ontological foundations. Three methodological propositions follow.
Institutional stabilization is not equivalent to practical relevance
A professional role, a legal category, a commercial contract or a religious institution may exist as a durable symbolic and multimaterial stabilization. Its existence does not mean that every interaction it touches is organized around the recognition and maintenance of its boundaries. A guest can use a key without reflecting on the nature of contractual hospitality. A volunteer can serve food without deciding whether the kitchen is a household or an institution. A farmer can tap rubber without considering whether the activity belongs to a market order. At other moments these distinctions may become crucial, as they did at the Greek clothing bank. That difference, between the moments when a stabilized distinction is merely present and the moments when it becomes relevant, is what ethnography needs to establish.
Recursivity explains when a classification becomes an object of concern
Living Value Theory distinguishes five levels of recursivity, which describe how far a coordination has been taken up, articulated and reworked by those engaged in it. At the first level (L1), people coordinate through settled habits and expectations without needing to articulate their organizing conditions. At L2, a disruption is felt, and very often remedied, without anything being said. At L3, participants articulate what has gone wrong. At L4, an institutional procedure, rule or classification is brought to bear to stabilize a resolution. At L5, people reflect on the classifications themselves, including their legitimacy and their applicability.
The Airbnb dispute is an economical example, because each level can be identified without invoking the family/market opposition. Unlocking a door with a key is L1 coordination. The key failing in the wrong lock, and the unanswered telephone, constitute an L2 disruption. The guest's demand for reimbursement and the host's explanation about her children are L3 articulations. The appeal to Airbnb's conflict resolution service is L4. Bird-David's interpretation, which asks what kinds of social order the two articulations express, is an L5 operation performed by the analyst. Different levels become relevant to explaining different moments of the coordination. An analytical category that seems fundamental to an L5 ethnographic interpretation may have been entirely irrelevant to the L1 activity, and even to the L3 and L4 moments that followed its disruption. The anthropologist's own classification should not be projected backward into the participants' practical concerns. The recursivity levels also cast the finding of a single monetary dispute in a new light. If most disruptions in homestays are felt and remedied at L2, without articulation, then the rarity of open conflict is exactly what one would expect, and no theory of skilful oscillation between orders is needed to explain it.
The five mediations prevent the reduction of coordination to institutional categories
Living Value Theory also distinguishes five mediations of living coordination: multisensorial embodiment, multispecies being-with, multiversal dwelling, multimateriality and multisymbolization. Their purpose here is to discipline attention to features that institutional classification tends to obscure, rather than to supply five compartments into which the chapters of this volume must be sorted. The stakes documented in the volume include pain, hunger, illness, grief, physical safety, companionship, livelihood, environmental viability, material access, symbolic recognition and enforceable obligation. Many involve metabolic remediation directly, as at the Greek soup kitchens. Others concern maintaining valued relationships, securing continuity, responding to uncertainty, or enabling activities whose stakes are not reducible to immediate bodily need, as at the Spiritualist demonstrations. A fivefold analysis should remain sensitive to what is at stake in a particular coordination, rather than assuming that one kind of stake governs every case.
Anthropologists are not thereby prohibited from asking questions their interlocutors do not ask. They may identify hidden structures, indirect effects, long historical processes or forms of harm that participants do not articulate, and Eräsaari's tax units and Rosa and Orphanides's longer histories of racialization are cases in point. But the relevance of such questions must be justified. What process does the proposed classification explain? Which differences does it make visible, and which does it obscure? What observations would count against its importance? Could the same activity be explained more adequately without it? These are conditions of comparative accountability. They permit classification without granting analytical classifications automatic explanatory authority.
The constructive formulation can therefore be stated plainly. The question is not how many social orders people inhabit but how living coordination proceeds, how historically stabilized arrangements enter into it, and when those arrangements become consequential for particular participants.
IX. Conclusion: The Ethnographic Surplus of Manifold Anthropology
The volume achieves something significant by demonstrating that institutional arrangements are rarely as unified, stable or all-encompassing as anthropologists have sometimes assumed. Its chapters document coordination across differences, the portability of organizational forms, the instability of categories and the uneven consequences of political and economic institutions. Yet the evidence also points to a more radical possibility than the editors' framework fully explores. People frequently coordinate without the distinctions between institutional orders becoming their concern. When those distinctions do become consequential, their relevance is generally intelligible through more immediate stakes: bodily injury, financial liability, care, access to resources, bureaucratic recognition, political exclusion, the maintenance of livelihood. The classifications themselves are often not what participants are trying to resolve.
Malinowski supplies a closing irony. In the introduction to Argonauts, discussing what he called the imponderabilia of actual life, he insisted that family life could not be adequately described through its formal institutional ties alone, and that the ethnographer had to capture the affection, attentiveness and innumerable small interactions through which kinship was actually lived. A century later, Bird-David describes people preparing food, sharing rooms, caring for one another and becoming friends, and sometimes reads precisely such interactions as evidence that they are entering a family social order. The everyday intimacy that Malinowski sought to rescue from institutional description becomes, in her hands, evidence for another institutional distinction. And just as Malinowski's description of the Kula exceeds the comparative categories through which it became famous, the ethnographies in Manifold Anthropology frequently preserve more of living coordination than the theory of overlapping social orders can explain.
This is meant as critical appreciation rather than dismissal. The strongest studies in the volume, those of Douzina-Bakalaki, Greenberg, Blanchette, Eräsaari and Kaartinen above all, are precisely the ones that make their organizing classifications revisable. Two intellectual advances should be distinguished. The first is to reject the assumption that people live within singular, bounded institutions, cultures and societies. The second, more fundamental, is to reject the assumption that institutional boundaries provide the most relevant starting point for explaining what people do. Manifold anthropology has accomplished much of the first task, and its own ethnographies make the second increasingly difficult to avoid. It has replaced bounded social orders with overlapping ones while retaining the assumption that social orders provide the fundamental framework for understanding human activity. Its best contributors have already begun, in their ethnographic practice if not yet in their vocabulary, to move beyond that assumption.
The question that should govern such an investigation from the outset is a simple one. Whose problem is this boundary, why does it matter to them, and what were they trying to accomplish before it became a problem?
References
Unless otherwise indicated, page numbers in parentheses refer to the volume under review.
Bird-David, Nurit. 2026. "Multiple Social Orders in Airbnb Homestays." In Manifold Anthropology: Reordering Relations, edited by Ilana Gershon and Sarah Green, 229–246. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
Ecks, Stefan. 2026. "From Lived Worlds to Portable Classifications: Malinowski's Argonauts and the Problem of Comparative Relevance." Living Value Theory, livingvaluetheory.org.
Gershon, Ilana. 2019. "Porous Social Orders." American Ethnologist 46 (4): 404–416.
Gershon, Ilana, and Sarah Green, eds. 2026. Manifold Anthropology: Reordering Relations. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
Green, Sarah, Samuli Lähteenaho, Phaedra Douzina-Bakalaki, Carl Rommel, Joseph J. Viscomi, Laia Soto Bermant and Patricia Scalco. 2024. An Anthropology of Crosslocations. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
Malinowski, Bronisław. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. London: George Routledge and Sons.
Cite as: Ecks, Stefan. 2026. Whose Problem Is the Boundary? Manifold Anthropology and the Problem of Comparative Relevance. Living Value Theory, livingvaluetheory.org.