Abstract. Social theories are often remarkably successful at identifying consequentialities across very different situations. Their principal limitation is that success at identifying a particular consequentiality is easily confused with evidence of its vital importance, and need not involve empirical error at all. This article distinguishes four questions that social analysis routinely runs together: whether a theory applies, whether its account is correct, how salient the phenomenon it identifies is, and what is vitally at stake in the coordination as a whole. It describes how theoretical frameworks foreground what they are designed to recognize and background other dimensions of living coordination, producing explanations that can be correct and comparatively peripheral at once. It separates three operations through which theories determine what matters, identification, validation and transposition, and distinguishes the transposition of a concept’s applicability from the transposition of its explanatory priority. Beneath these lies a deeper and shared bias. Across otherwise competing traditions, from Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel to Parsons, Goffman, Bourdieu, Foucault, Habermas and Luhmann, social theory has tended to make relations among humans the privileged explanatory destination, so that embodiment, dwelling, made things and symbols are interpreted through their significance for human being-with. The article names this social truncation, shows what it backgrounds across five mediations of living coordination, takes the analysis of religion as its decisive demonstration, and distinguishes it from earlier critiques of the social, including Latour’s, whose opposition of matters of fact to matters of concern is itself an allocation of stakes made in advance. Living Value Theory is presented as an architecture that permits the investigation of living coordination without assuming either which consequentialities will prove most important or that their importance must ultimately be social.

I. Introduction: How Social Theory Can Be Right About the Wrong Thing

A woman slips on an icy pavement, puts out her hand to break the fall, and arrives at an emergency department with a fractured wrist. Several social theories could study what happens next, and each could be right.

A Foucauldian analysis would show the clinical gaze at work: the patient translated into an X-ray, a classification and a set of observations, her own account of the fall reduced to what the protocol can use. A Goffmanian analysis would show the delicate face-work of the examination, the patient managing embarrassment and pain, the doctor managing authority and haste, both sustaining the fragile order of an encounter in which a stranger handles a body. A Bourdieusian analysis would show how the patient’s class shapes the encounter: how confidently she describes her symptoms, whether she asks questions, how she is heard. A Marxist analysis would show the political economy of the department: staffing levels, waiting times, the pressure of throughput on every consultation. Each analysis could be empirically correct in every detail.

And yet the patient’s most vital stakes may lie elsewhere. Whether the bone is set correctly; whether the cast holds it while it knits; whether the pain lets her sleep; whether her hand will grip again in six weeks, so that she can return to work, carry shopping, hold a grandchild. These stakes run through her body, through the cast and the medicines, through the instructions she is given and whether she can follow them, and through the people who will help her at home. Some of them are social. Many are not, or not primarily. An account of the encounter that described power, face, class and political economy with great precision, and treated the knitting of the bone as background, would be correct and peripheral at once.

The example shows that four questions must be kept apart. Is a theory applicable: can its concepts identify something in the coordination? Is its account correct: does the phenomenon occur, and is it adequately explained? How salient is the phenomenon within the wider coordination, and for whom? And what is vitally at stake: what does the continuation, disruption or transformation of the coordination actually depend on? These questions call for different evidence. A theory can be applicable without being informative, correct about something peripheral, and excellent as an explanation of what matters little to the beings involved. The central problem of social theory, on this view, is less theoretical error than misplaced explanatory priority.

The four analyses of the fractured wrist also share something. Each makes a dimension of relations among humans the destination of its explanation: power relations, interaction order, class relations, relations of production. They differ radically about what those relations involve. They agree that this is where the explanation should arrive. This article argues that this shared destination is a deeper bias than any particular theory’s preferences. Social theory has a systematic tendency to foreground human being-with, even where the vital stakes of a coordination lie primarily in embodiment, dwelling, made things or symbols. The article names this tendency social truncation.

The argument proceeds in steps. It first describes how theories foreground and background, and why this can happen when every observation is correct. It then shows the privileging of the social across classical and contemporary social theory, sets out three operations through which theories determine what matters, traces what social truncation backgrounds across five mediations of living coordination, and takes religion as its decisive demonstration. It closes by asking why ordinary practical attention often recognizes vital stakes more readily than specialized theory, and how Living Value Theory proposes to investigate living coordination without deciding in advance either which stakes matter or that they must be social.

II. The Hidden Operation: Foregrounding and Backgrounding Vital Stakes

A vital stake needs a precise definition if the argument is to do any work. A consequentiality is vital to a living coordination when the continuation, disruption or transformation of the coordination, or of the living beings engaged in it, depends on it. Stakes are facts about dependence, and four kinds of evidence bear on them: what happens when the consequentiality fails, is withdrawn or is blocked; what participants and others do to secure, repair or restore it, and at what cost; where breakdown appears when it goes wrong, and who bears it; and how it is distributed among the beings involved, across the mediations through which they coordinate, and over time. A consequentiality that can disappear without anyone having to adjust is unlikely to be vital, however interesting it is. One whose failure forces repair, flight, grief or reorganization probably is. Several stakes can coexist in one coordination, conflict among its participants and shift as it unfolds. No coordination need have a single dominant stake, and the problem examined here is the presumption that a particular class of stakes has priority without that priority having been established.

The four questions of the introduction can be set out together.

Question

What it asks

Applicability

Can the theory’s concepts identify something in this coordination?

Correctness

Does the identified phenomenon occur, and does the theory explain it adequately?

Salience

What relative importance does the phenomenon have within the wider coordination, and for whom?

Vital importance

What does the continuation, disruption or transformation of the coordination depend on?

Theories move from the first two questions to the last two without announcing it, and the mechanism that carries them is the allocation of attention. A theory makes certain phenomena especially visible, intelligible and worth explaining, and simultaneously makes others appear secondary, contextual or uninteresting. This allocation need not produce a single false observation. The more sophisticated the theory, the more successfully it may identify its preferred phenomena. A researcher trained in Foucauldian analysis becomes exceptionally sensitive to subtle forms of power; one trained in Bourdieu recognizes distinctions that others overlook; one trained in Goffman notices interactional adjustments too delicate for untrained eyes. These are real analytical achievements. The same competence makes it harder to recognize the relative importance of phenomena outside the framework’s preferred field. The investigator notices what the theory predicts and backgrounds what the participants are principally trying to accomplish.

Two things are at work and should be distinguished. Selective visibility concerns what the investigator notices. Explanatory priority concerns what the investigator treats as fundamentally important. The two reinforce each other. The theory directs attention to certain phenomena, the attention yields abundant findings, and the abundance of findings seems to justify the theory’s prominence. An investigator can accumulate extensive and accurate evidence without ever establishing that the foregrounded consequentiality is especially vital. This differs from confirmation bias, which concerns the selective acceptance of evidence for a proposition already held. Theoretical self-reinforcement can occur when all the evidence is accepted and accurately interpreted. The theory may be right about everything it foregrounds and misleading about the coordination as a whole.

The operation is rarely announced, which is part of why it has been so hard to see. Major theorists do not begin by declaring that one form of consequentiality will be privileged over all others. They undertake extensive investigations of particular phenomena, and the richness of those investigations conceals the prior selection. The reader is absorbed in the mechanics of surplus value, the effervescence of the assembly, the timetable and the examination, and ceases to ask why this phenomenon was made the explanatory centre. The selection is distributed across hundreds of pages of demonstration, each persuasive in its own terms, and the authority earned by the demonstrations flows back to the selection.

One safeguard is needed against misunderstanding. The theorist’s interest is not necessarily the participants’ stake, and a vital stake need not be articulated, intended or desired by anyone. The reproduction of capitalist relations can be consequential for workers who oppose it; power can shape people who do not recognize it; a virus can be vitally at stake in a household where no one knows of its presence. Vital stakes cannot be reduced to stated purposes, and an argument that took participants’ declarations as final would be as unwarranted as one that ignored them. The theorist’s interests, the causal consequences of what happens, the concerns participants articulate and the stakes that can be empirically established must remain distinguishable, and whether they coincide in a given case is part of what has to be found out.

The selection of what matters has a classical precedent. Following Rickert (1986), Weber argued that because reality is infinite, every investigation depends on a principle of selection, and that the phenomena social science studies are those of cultural significance, a significance derived from their relation to the investigator’s values (Weber 1949). Weber made the operation visible. He also grounded it in the value ideas of the investigator and the investigator’s age, which explains why the questions of social science have a history and leaves no test by which a selection could be found wrong about what the people studied were coordinating for. The tests of dependence are proposed as that missing test.

III. Classical Social Theory and the Privileging of the Social

The traditions considered here do not say the same thing, and none of them simply ignores bodies, places, things or symbols. The question for each is narrower and more exact: what form of consequentiality does it foreground, what discoveries does that make possible, and do the other dimensions of living coordination receive explanatory independence, or do they become instruments, expressions or conditions of relations among humans?

Marx is the strongest counterexample to any simple version of the claim. Capital describes the labour process as a process between man and nature in which human beings regulate their metabolism with nature, and its chapters on the working day and on machinery are among the most detailed accounts of bodily exhaustion, injury and material technique in social thought (Marx 1976). Embodiment and multimateriality are present everywhere. Yet the labour process in general is introduced in order to be subordinated to the analysis of its specifically capitalist form, and the explanatory work of Capital is done by relations of production: by what the working day means for the extraction of surplus value, and what machinery means for the relation between capital and labour. Bodily and material stakes receive their explanatory significance through social relations of production. Engels’s later insistence that the economic element is ultimately determining without being the only determining one did not change where explanation was expected to arrive (Engels 1890).

Durkheim made the privileging of the social a methodological rule. Social facts are to be treated as things, and the determining cause of a social fact is to be sought among antecedent social facts (Durkheim 1982). The rule secured sociology its object. It also fixed in advance the domain within which explanations must terminate. Durkheim’s account of religion, discussed below, is the clearest case in classical theory of a phenomenon whose participants located its stakes elsewhere being explained through its consequences for collective life.

Weber is the hardest test of the hypothesis, and he partly passes it. His methodological pluralism, his insistence on the heterogeneity of values and his refusal to replace one one-sided interpretation of history with another (Weber 1930) all resist the presumption of a single substantive stake. But his definition of the discipline’s object is telling. Action is social, in Weber’s definition, insofar as its meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course (Weber 1978). Weber did not claim that all action is social. He defined sociology as the science of the part that is, and the definition makes orientation to other humans the threshold at which action becomes an object of the discipline. Weber limits the privilege of the social more carefully than most; he does not abandon it.

Simmel’s sociology of forms is the most explicit version of the operation. Simmel distinguished the forms of sociation, superordination and subordination, competition, conflict, secrecy, from their contents: the drives, interests and purposes that bring people together, which in themselves are not social (Simmel 2009). The distinction is enormously productive, since it lets the sociologist see that a guild and a church share a form of hierarchy. But it is also a decision to make the forms of human association the object of analysis whatever the substantive coordination. What a gathering is for, healing, worship, harvest, survival, becomes content, and content is handed to other disciplines. Simmel’s formalism does not deny other stakes; it declares them outside sociology.

Parsons made social order the organizing problem of theory and systemic integration its answer. The Social System set out the functional prerequisites that any social system must meet (Parsons 1951), and his later scheme of four functional problems, adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latent pattern maintenance, specifies in advance what a social system depends on (Parsons and Smelser 1956). Even the organism appears in the general theory of action as a subsystem with a function for the action system. Parsons is useful precisely because his functional prerequisites state openly what other theories presume: a list of stakes fixed before any coordination is studied, organized around the persistence of the social system.

Goffman is among the strongest possible tests, because his attention to situated encounters is so fine. He argued that the interaction order is a substantive domain in its own right (Goffman 1983), and he revealed consequentialities in encounters that no other approach could see: face, deference, demeanour, the work of keeping an encounter going (Goffman 1967). But the interaction order is not necessarily what is most vitally at stake in every encounter. The patient with the fractured wrist must maintain face while she is examined, and she needs an accurate diagnosis. Both are consequential. Their relative importance cannot be established by interaction analysis alone, since interaction analysis was built to see the first.

Bourdieu shows how a theory can be empirically powerful precisely because its preferred consequentiality is widespread. Habitus, field, capital and distinction make social reproduction visible in education, taste, housing, language and sport (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Bourdieu also wrote deeply about the body, in his account of bodily hexis and of dispositions incorporated as a second nature. But the body enters as the site where social structure is inscribed and reproduced. What a meal does for a body, or a house for those who sleep in it, becomes significant through what it reveals about position in social space. The identification of reproduction is so reliably available that it easily becomes the assumed explanation of activities whose principal stakes may lie elsewhere.

Foucault’s investigations extend further than most into bodies, institutions, material arrangements and practices of the self: the clinical gaze, the architecture of the prison, the timetable, the examination, the regimen (Foucault 1973, 1977, 1978). The critique must acknowledge this richness. The question is how these dimensions are organized within the explanation, and there they become the means, targets and effects of power and knowledge. Power, Foucault insisted, is everywhere because it comes from everywhere (Foucault 1978). Its ubiquity makes it endlessly applicable. Applicability is not importance, and the existence of power relations in a coordination does not establish their priority among its vital stakes.

Habermas and Luhmann show that the privileging of the social need not take the form of reducing everything to interpersonal relations. For Habermas, the lifeworld is reproduced through communicative action, which secures cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization, and the central pathology of modernity is the colonization of the lifeworld by systems of money and power (Habermas 1984, 1987). Communicative coordination among speakers becomes the privileged medium in which modern life is to be understood and judged. Luhmann went further. Society, for Luhmann, consists not of human beings but of communications, and human beings belong to its environment (Luhmann 1995). This is the most radical delimitation of the social in the literature. It does not reduce living coordination to relations among persons; it removes persons, bodies and places from the social altogether and leaves the social defined by the one mediation it retains.

Across these traditions a pattern emerges. They disagree about almost everything, including what relations among humans consist of. They share a destination. Whatever the phenomenon with which analysis begins, bodily, material, spatial, religious or symbolic, the analysis moves toward an account of what it does for, in or through relations among humans. Two levels of theoretical selection are therefore at work. The first is the selection of a particular consequentiality within social theory: production, solidarity, power, distinction, interaction. The second, prior to it, is the selection of human social relations as the domain in which consequentialities are expected to matter most. Competing theories contest the first while sharing the second. The second selection has a history. Classical sociology secured its object by demarcation: against psychology, which claimed the individual mind; against biology, which claimed the body and heredity; against geography, which claimed climate and terrain. Durkheim’s rule that social facts be explained by social facts, Weber’s threshold of orientation to others and Simmel’s separation of form from content are, among other things, boundary markers in that demarcation. What remained inside the boundary after the body, the land and the mind had been assigned elsewhere was relations among humans. The bias examined here is therefore less an error of individual theorists than an inheritance of the way the discipline was founded, and it is reproduced each time a new theory defines its object as a variety of the social.

IV. Three Operations: Identification, Validation and Transposition

The determination of what matters proceeds through three analytically distinct operations, which need not occur in sequence. Identification is the recognition of a consequentiality within a wider field of living coordination. It is productive and indispensable, and much of the history of social theory is a history of successful identifications: of exploitation, of collective effervescence, of disciplinary power. Identification establishes that a consequentiality belongs among the things happening in a coordination. It does not establish its rank.

Validation establishes whether an identified consequentiality is vitally at stake in the coordination, and with what salience among other consequentialities. An ethnographer may show that ward rounds in a hospital reproduce the hierarchy between consultants, junior doctors and nurses. The finding may be correct. When a round is cancelled or rushed, however, what fails may be that a deterioration goes unnoticed, a drug interaction is missed, a discharge is delayed and a bed is blocked for someone waiting downstairs. If so, what the round depends on includes the coordinated attention of many people to sick bodies over time, and hierarchy may be its condition, its by-product or its obstacle. Validation can find a proposed stake absent, present but secondary, present and decisive, or jointly decisive with others.

Transposition carries a consequentiality identified in one coordination into another. Its structure has been analysed in the philosophy of evidence-based policy: a randomized trial can establish that an intervention worked in one population without establishing that it will work in another, and the question “it worked there; will it work here?” requires evidence that the intervention plays the same causal role in the new setting and that its support factors are present (Cartwright and Hardie 2012). Transposition in social theory faces a further difficulty, which requires a distinction between the transposition of applicability and the transposition of priority. A concept travels successfully when it continues to identify something in the new setting. Its explanatory priority travels only if what it identifies remains as vital there as it was where the concept was formed. The first may succeed while the second fails, and this is the precise form of what can be called conceptual overcommensuration: coordinations become equivalent because they share a feature a theory has already selected as fundamental, and similarity in one consequentiality is mistaken for equivalence in vital stakes.

Transposition of priority can succeed, and the method must be able to show when it does. Marx’s analysis of the struggle over the length and intensity of the working day, carried into contemporary platform delivery work, is warranted if couriers’ livelihoods depend on time worked and orders completed, if their bodies bear the costs of speed and exhaustion, if they and the platforms act to secure or contest control over time and pace, and if failures of that control appear as injury, debt and lost income. Where the evidence shows this, the priority travels. Where couriers work for pocket money between other commitments, the concept still applies and the priority does not.

A theory can also be transposed in order to be refuted, and this form is easily mistaken for its opposite. Margaret Mead went to Samoa in 1925 to answer a question posed by Franz Boas about the relative strength of biological puberty and cultural pattern; her book’s subtitle described it as a study of primitive youth for Western civilisation (Mead 1928), and Samoa became the discipline’s best-known negative instance against biological determinism (Strathern 1983). Derek Freeman’s refutation reversed the verdict while keeping the question (Freeman 1983). Comparative research and theoretical disconfirmation are legitimate, and nothing in the argument counts against them. The problem arose where both ethnographies made the theoretical question the presumed stake of Samoan coming of age, ranking what they found by its bearing on a debate about human nature. Many Samoans objected to both portraits, above all to their accounts of private life, which bore on the honour of families and the reputation of daughters (Shankman 2009). Those stakes were organized by rank, age and gender, and neither ethnography was built to find them. For the coordination studied, confirmation and disconfirmation were one operation: in both, a question brought from elsewhere decided what in Samoan life was worth explaining. The debate between Sahlins and Obeyesekere over whether Hawaiians took Captain Cook for a god has the same structure, with each side claiming to protect Hawaiians from the other’s imposition (Obeyesekere 1992; Sahlins 1995).

Each operation has a characteristic failure.

Operation

Principal failure

Identification

A consequentiality is overlooked, misidentified or attributed without adequate evidence

Validation

A correctly identified consequentiality is mistaken for a vital or dominant stake

Transposition

A concept’s applicability is taken as evidence that its explanatory priority has travelled with it

The failures compound. An incorrectly validated stake may be transposed repeatedly, and each successful application read as further confirmation, until a theory appears universally applicable because it keeps finding the consequentiality it was built to recognize.

V. Social Truncation Across the Five Mediations

Social truncation occurs when a living coordination involving several irreducible mediations is explained primarily through its human being-with dimension, without empirical justification for assigning that dimension priority. It does not require denying the other mediations. A socially truncated account may describe bodies, places, materials and symbols in extraordinary detail. The truncation occurs when these become instruments, expressions or conditions of human social relations instead of being investigated as possible sites of vital stakes in their own right. One principle follows, and it guides the rest of the argument: the presence of a mediation in an account does not establish that the mediation has been granted explanatory independence. Living Value Theory distinguishes five mediations of living coordination, and social truncation can be traced through each of the four that it subordinates to the fifth.

Multisensorial embodiment includes hunger, sleep, pain, exhaustion, illness, injury, temperature regulation and metabolic continuation. These are profoundly shaped by social relations, and they are not exhausted by them. In the emergency department, an account that foregrounds professional domination while backgrounding bodily recovery may be correct about power and inadequate as an account of the treatment encounter. The weeks that follow make the difference plain. The bone knits or fails to knit; the swelling under the cast subsides or presses on a nerve; pain keeps the woman awake or lets her sleep; the physiotherapy exercises restore movement or the wrist stiffens. The social relations involved, with the fracture clinic, with a daughter who helps with dressing, with an employer waiting for her return, are consequential, and an account of her recovery would be incomplete without them. They are also organized around a body whose own recursive repair sets the timetable, the limits and the risks. To treat that repair as the background against which the social drama of care unfolds is to invert the dependence. Sleep makes the point more sharply still. Sleeping involves embodiment, being-with and dwelling: a body’s periodic reconfiguration, the presence of others who keep watch or share a bed, and the temperature, light and safety of a place. Its success does not depend on elaborate human institutions, and every living being with a nervous system does it. A sociology of sleep can show how work schedules, housing and gender organize who sleeps when and where, and it should. What the sleeper depends on is still, in large part, whether the night restores the body.

Multiversal dwelling includes finding shelter, navigating terrain, adjusting to seasons, coping with drought and maintaining relations with particular places. A community’s activities around water may reproduce social hierarchies, and a theory of reproduction may correctly identify inequalities of access. The vital stakes may still concern the availability, movement and reliability of the water itself: when the spring runs, how far the rains reach, whether the well holds through the dry months. Dwelling stakes are not necessarily more important than social ones. Their relative importance has to be discovered, and a theory organized around access will not discover it.

Multimateriality includes tools, medicines, buildings, roads, machinery, clothing and infrastructures. These signify status, reproduce inequality and organize authority. They also make particular forms of coordination possible, and their material efficacy must be distinguished from their social and symbolic consequences. A medicine must be manufactured, transported, stored, prescribed, taken and metabolically effective. Its symbolic associations and its place in professional power do not exhaust what is at stake in taking it. The question is not whether objects have social meanings, which they always do, but whether those meanings are what matters most in the coordination at hand.

Multisymbolization includes prayers, promises, legal declarations, written instructions, sacred texts, mathematical notation and ritual utterances. Social theory has interpreted symbols above all through the social relations they express, reproduce or legitimate. Yet symbols do several things that are irreducible to that. They coordinate a mesocosm directly, as an instruction on a medicine packet determines whether a patient takes the drug correctly. They refer to what is absent, as a promise binds a future no one can yet see. They re-present, as a legal declaration makes a change in status present and binding. A prayer may be directed toward a divine counterpart and not toward the congregation that hears it. Each of these modes has its own consequentialities, and none collapses automatically into human being-with.

Being-with itself, finally, is wider than relations among humans. Living Value Theory names it multispecies being-with, the coordination of a living being with other beings that respond to its responses. Social truncation narrows it twice: first by privileging being-with over the other mediations, then by equating being-with with relations among humans.

VI. Religion and the Reduction of Divine Coordination to Human Relations

Religion is the decisive demonstration of social truncation because it exposes, more clearly than any other domain, the difference between a coordination’s consequences for human relations and the stakes its participants enact. Religious practices involve groups, obligations, gatherings, institutions and hierarchies, so social theory can always identify social effects. Yet many religious practices are explicitly concerned with gods, spirits, ancestors, divine powers or realities that participants do not understand as reducible to human society.

Durkheim is the clearest classical case. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life built its theory on Australian ethnography, chiefly Spencer and Gillen’s accounts of the Arrernte (Spencer and Gillen 1899; Durkheim 1995). Among the rites Durkheim analysed at greatest length were the increase ceremonies, performed at particular sites to make the totemic species, plants and animals, multiply. The participants’ understanding of what the rites achieved was explicit and concerned other species and particular places: the plants and animals on which life depended were to increase. Durkheim did not deny that they believed this. He argued that the rites’ real efficacy lay elsewhere, in the moral remaking of the group that performed them, so that the collective renewed itself through rites it understood as acting on the world. The argument identifies a real possibility: rituals can strengthen solidarity, and collective effervescence is a real phenomenon. But a rite that renews collective life does not thereby have collective renewal as its principal vital stake. What the participants were coordinating with, species, sites, seasons and ancestral beings, was multispecies being-with and multiversal dwelling, and Durkheim’s explanation assigned these the status of symbols of the group.

Three propositions are routinely conflated in the social analysis of religion. Religious practices involve human social coordination. Religious practices may have important consequences for human social relations. Those consequences identify what is fundamentally at stake in the practices. The first two can be correct without establishing the third, and the third is the one that social truncation asserts without validating. The tests of dependence show what validation would involve. What do participants do when a rite cannot be performed, or is performed wrongly? What do they expect to follow, and for whom, and what do they do to repair it? Which counterparts are addressed, and what responses are looked for? Where does failure appear: in the group’s cohesion, in a harvest, in a sick body, in a relationship with an ancestor, in the participant’s own conduct? Such questions neither presuppose the participants’ cosmology nor dismiss it. They ask what the coordination depends on, and they allow the answer to be social, divine, ecological, bodily or several of these at once.

The opposite reduction must be avoided. It would be as unwarranted to assert that religious practices are always fundamentally about divine beings as to assert that they are always about society. A Sunday service may be, for some of its participants on some Sundays, mainly about seeing neighbours, and for others mainly about God; a pilgrimage may be about a vow, a cure, a family obligation or a holiday. Nor should relations with gods, spirits or ancestors be placed in a separate category of supernatural experience outside the mediations. As participants understand and enact them, such relations may be interrecursive: the deity is addressed, is understood to respond, and is answered in turn. The error social truncation commits is to equate being-with with relations among humans and then treat nonhuman or divine counterparts as symbolic expressions of those relations. The divine may be approached through being-with, dwelling, embodiment, made things and symbols in many configurations. Living Value Theory does not decide in advance whether a divine being exists independently of human coordination, and it does not reduce participants’ relations with that being to social symbolism. Its task is to investigate the coordination and its stakes, which remain an empirical question in every case.

VII. Theoretical Commitment and the Misallocation of Attention

Identifying vital stakes is often assumed to require elaborate theoretical interpretation. In ordinary living coordination, beings respond constantly to what matters to others. People recognize hunger, exhaustion, distress, danger, attachment, practical urgency and the need for help, and they often understand what another person is trying to accomplish without any formal theory of social life. A nurse sees that a patient has not slept; a passer-by sees that the woman on the ice cannot get up; a parent knows which cry means hunger. Vital stakes are not always transparent. Some are hidden, disputed, historically structured or hard to articulate, and some are unknown to those whose lives depend on them. But ordinary practical attention suggests that theoretical commitment can make their recognition harder than it would otherwise be.

This is a paradox of specialized training. It improves the recognition of particular consequentialities and can diminish openness to the wider coordination. A researcher may become exceptionally skilled at identifying power and comparatively inattentive to pain. Another may recognize symbolic classifications while overlooking the practical importance of a functioning tool. Another may interpret ritual as social reproduction while failing to take seriously participants’ coordination with divine or other-than-human counterparts. In each case the researcher sees more than an untrained observer within the theory’s field and less outside it, and the theory’s self-reinforcement makes the loss hard to notice.

The alternative to theoretical commitment lies elsewhere than in abandoning theory: it lies in distinguishing a theory that tells the investigator what to find from an investigative architecture that keeps open the question of what matters. The test of openness can be stated through the concept of askability. An inquiry is open only when the coordination being investigated can force the investigator to revise not merely the details of an explanation but the identification of what deserves explanation. A framework within which the woman on the ice could not make the knitting of her bone askable, because the framework’s questions concern power, face or class, is closed in this sense, however rich its findings.

Practically, this suggests a different order of inquiry. Before asking what a coordination reveals about power, class, interaction or solidarity, an investigator can ask what the beings involved are doing to keep it going, what they treat as failure, and what they do when failure threatens. The people who care for others, nurses, parents, farmers, ritual specialists, often answer these questions with an exactness that theory lacks, because their own practice depends on getting them right. Their practical attention is evidence, though not the last word. Theory then enters as a means of investigating what the coordination has been shown to depend on, instead of deciding it beforehand. The order matters because a theory introduced first will tend to find its own consequentialities, while a theory introduced after the stakes have been located can be tested against them.

VIII. Neighbours: From the Critique of Durkheim to Matters of Concern

The privileging of the social has been criticized before, and the argument developed here should be placed among those criticisms. Within the study of religion, objections to Durkheim’s sociological reduction are almost as old as The Elementary Forms itself. Goldenweiser argued soon after its publication that Durkheim had made the social the source of religious experience without showing that it was (Goldenweiser 1917), and Evans-Pritchard later concluded that sociological theories of primitive religion had explained religion away instead of explaining it (Evans-Pritchard 1965). These critiques stay within the anthropology of religion. They do not generalize into a claim about the explanatory destination of social theory as a whole.

Other critiques have targeted the person or the organism. Wrong’s attack on the oversocialized conception of man objected to a sociology in which people are moved entirely by internalized norms and the desire for acceptance (Wrong 1961), and Benton argued that sociology’s founding hostility to biology had repressed the organism it could not do without (Benton 1991). Catton and Dunlap named sociology’s Human Exemptionalism Paradigm, its tacit assumption that human societies are exempt from ecological constraint, and proposed a New Ecological Paradigm in its place (Catton and Dunlap 1978). Their diagnosis is social truncation in the dimension of dwelling, stated nearly half a century ago. Ingold dissolved the division between the social and the biological, treating persons as organisms whose skills develop within a field of relations with others and with an environment (Ingold 2000). Multispecies ethnography and the new materialisms have since insisted that animals, plants, microbes and things are participants in social life and not its backdrop (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; Bennett 2010). Each of these restores a dimension that social theory had backgrounded. Most do so by expanding the domain of analysis, or by reversing its priority, so that ecological limits, the organism, dwelling skill or vibrant matter become the new ground. None separates the question of whether a dimension is present from the question of whether it is decisive, and none proposes tests by which that priority would be established case by case.

Latour comes closest. Reassembling the Social argued that the social is what needs to be explained, not what does the explaining, and that sociologists who invoke social forces to account for science, religion or law have mistaken the result of an assembly for its cause (Latour 2005a). This is very near the claim that social theory makes relations among humans its explanatory destination. In his essay on why critique had run out of steam, Latour proposed to replace matters of fact with matters of concern: to stop debunking facts as social constructions and to describe things instead as gatherings, assemblies of the many parties concerned with them (Latour 2004). In both respects he anticipates parts of the present argument.

Latour also reproduces, in a new form, the operation diagnosed here. His framework has no concept of mediations and no distinction among types of counterpart: humans, microbes, instruments and texts all appear as actants, symmetrically, in networks of association. Associations are traced, but nothing in the method ranks them, so the question of which associations a coordination depends on has no place. More importantly, the opposition between matters of fact and matters of concern is itself an allocation of stakes made in advance. It makes the status of knowledge, whether something is a fact, how it was made, who is concerned with it, the axis along which every thing is redescribed. Sometimes that is exactly what is vitally at stake: in a courtroom, a clinical trial or a controversy over climate data, the difference between fact and concern can decide everything. Mostly it is not. Whether the woman’s wrist knits depends neither on its status as a fact nor on the assembly of those concerned with it, though both exist. And the late reformulation of the thing as a gathering, a parliament of things in which nonhumans take their seats (Latour 2005b), relocates the explanatory destination without abandoning it. The destination becomes the assembly. It includes nonhumans, and it remains a form of political being-with.

What the argument of this article adds to these neighbours is therefore specific. It neither expands the social nor replaces it with another ground. It separates applicability, correctness, salience and vital importance; it asks for evidence of dependence before priority is assigned; and it distinguishes the travel of a concept from the travel of its priority. A framework that can say, in a given case, that the fact-concern distinction is decisive, and in another that it is beside the point, has moved from a different ontology of the social to a different relation between theory and inquiry.

IX. Living Value Theory: An Architecture Without Predetermined Stakes

Living Value Theory begins from living coordination, recursive mediation in a mesocosm, and investigates how living beings continue, adjust, disrupt and transform their relations with the world. It refuses two predeterminations. It does not decide in advance which consequentialities will prove vital, and it refuses the prior assumption that vital stakes must be principally social.

Its five mediations are multisensorial embodiment, multispecies being-with, multiversal dwelling, multimateriality and multisymbolization. The first three are zoetic, mediations that any living being must sustain; the last two are poietic, through which coordination is deposited in made things and symbols, and whose cumulative coupling is elaborated to an unusual degree in human life. The five are irreducible dimensions of living coordination within which different vital stakes can emerge, and in no sense competing theories of what matters. Being-with is one mediation among five, and not the explanatory foundation of the other four. This is the decisive contrast with social truncation. Living Value Theory does not deny the importance of human social relations. It denies their automatic priority. Nor does it assign priority in advance to embodiment, dwelling, made things or symbols; their relative importance must be established empirically.

Two further distinctions support this. Counterparts may be nonrecursive, changing only as matter changes; selfrecursive, altering in relation to their own ongoing state; or interrecursive, responding to the responses of others. Identifying an interrecursive counterpart, human, animal or divine, establishes a form of coordination whose stakes must still be investigated. And coordination proceeds at five levels of recursivity, from L1, where it runs without becoming salient, through felt salience at L2 and articulation at L3, to stabilized categories at L4 and theory at L5. A vital stake need not be articulated to be real, and much of what living beings depend on proceeds at L1 until it fails. The woman with the fractured wrist articulates her pain; she does not articulate the knitting of the bone, which is no less vital for proceeding without words.

An objection follows from the definition of a vital stake. If a stake is vital when the continuation of a living coordination depends on it, the continuation of life has perhaps been installed as the master stake. The objection misreads where the word applies. Vital qualifies the beings and the coordination, and leaves open what they depend on, which can be cosmic order, ancestors, honour, a share price or a correctly set bone. The definition asks of each candidate whether the coordination, or the beings in it, would be disrupted or transformed if it failed, not whether it serves survival.

The same standard applies to Living Value Theory itself. If it systematically foregrounded one mediation regardless of the evidence, it would reproduce the problem it criticizes. If its categories prevented investigators from recognizing consequentialities outside its architecture, its claim to openness would fail. The five mediations are proposed as universal dimensions of living coordination, not as five universal answers to what matters, and the framework states conditions under which it would be wrong: a coordination requiring a mediation irreducible to the five, a mediation derivable from the others, articulation without the lower levels, or a counterpart that fits none of the three types. Its openness must be demonstrated case by case, above all by investigators other than its author. What it makes possible, if it succeeds, is an investigation in which the social is neither excluded nor privileged before inquiry begins.

X. Conclusion

Social theories have been remarkably successful at finding social consequentialities, and poorly equipped to establish whether those consequentialities are what is most vitally at stake. The reasons are now visible. Theories foreground what they are designed to recognize, and their success at recognizing it is mistaken for evidence of its importance. Concepts travel with their applicability intact while their priority stays behind. And beneath the disagreements of competing traditions lies a shared decision that relations among humans are where explanations should arrive, so that bodies, places, things and symbols are read for what they do for human being-with, even where their own consequentialities matter more. None of this requires social theories to be false, and none of it diminishes what they have found. A theory can be right about everything it foregrounds and still misleading about what matters. Living Value Theory challenges the assumption that living coordination should be understood primarily as social life in the first place, and proposes instead an architecture in which what is at stake, social or otherwise, must be found. The question it puts to any explanation is whether it is relevant to what the coordination depends on, as well as whether it is correct. The more seriously a theory takes vital stakes, the less entitled it is to determine them in advance.

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