Abstract

John Dewey's theory of inquiry offers one of the most systematic existing accounts of the movement from unproblematic living through disturbance, reflective engagement and renewed coordination. His descriptions of felt difficulty, precognitive indeterminacy, problem formulation, experimental transformation and the restoration of unified situations closely anticipate central features of Living Value Theory (LVT). Yet the relationship between the two frameworks reveals a consequential distinction. Dewey develops a general account of inquiry arising within living, whereas LVT identifies recursive fluidity as a fundamental organisation of living coordination, whether or not inquiry occurs. The deepest difference concerns felt misalignment remediated without articulation, which LVT treats as the most common recursive achievement of living and one shared by all living beings, and which Dewey treats chiefly as the organic matrix from which distinctively human, symbolically articulated inquiry emerges. This article reconstructs Dewey's account through the 1910 and 1933 editions of How We Think and the 1938 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, and compares these formulations with LVT's five recursivity levels, five mediations and three types of recursive counterpart. It argues that Dewey both strongly anticipates and helps clarify LVT's distinctive contribution, and it develops a method of comparative recursivity-level profiling and a programme for investigating recursive fluidity empirically, demonstrated through a night of Kali Puja in West Bengal.

I. Introduction: The Predecessor Who Almost Discovered Recursive Fluidity

In the first chapter of How We Think, John Dewey observes that as long as activity glides smoothly along from one thing to another there is no call for reflection. Thinking begins in what he calls a forked-road situation, one that is ambiguous, presents a dilemma and proposes alternatives. Ordinary activity, in other words, generally proceeds without requiring reflection, and reflection becomes relevant when some difficulty interrupts that continuation. This is strikingly close to the distinction Living Value Theory draws between L1, seamless coordination, and L2, felt misalignment.

Nearly three decades later, in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey gave his celebrated definition: inquiry is "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole" (1938: 104–105). The definition begins in an unsettled situation, proceeds through operations that change it, and ends in a situation in which living activity can again go forward.

It is tempting to read the whole formulation as an anticipation of Living Value Theory. But that reading raises an unexpected question. If Dewey had already identified the movement from undisturbed coordination through difficulty, articulation and resolution, what remains to be discovered? That question organises this article. The aim is to determine whether the two approaches identify the same phenomenon and, if they do not, exactly where they diverge, rather than to manufacture terminological differences between them.

Four propositions will be defended. First, Dewey offers a sophisticated account of a characteristic trajectory within recursive fluidity. Second, Dewey's five phases of reflective thought and LVT's five recursivity levels are different kinds of analytical distinction, and the shared number five is incidental. Third, recursive fluidity extends beyond inquiry to include coordination, disturbance, remediation and stabilisation that never become organised as inquiry at all. The most consequential of these is felt misalignment remediated without articulation, which is by far the most common form of recursive adjustment, which belongs to all living beings, and which Dewey's framework, heavily invested in problems that become articulated, treats as the antecedent of inquiry rather than as a central object in its own right. Fourth, LVT adds methods for investigating the recursive selectivity of theories themselves, including the question of who is attributed the capacity for L5 reflection.

The governing question is therefore this: what becomes visible when inquiry is no longer taken as the organising phenomenon, and the analysis begins instead with recursive fluidity within living coordination itself?

II. Dewey's Discovery: From Indeterminate Situations to Restored Coordination

Dewey deserves a generous reconstruction, and three texts carry most of the weight: the 1910 edition of How We Think, its substantial 1933 revision, and the Logic of 1938.

The five phases of reflective thought (1910). In the sixth chapter of How We Think, "The Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought", Dewey examines a series of ordinary examples and concludes that each reveals, more or less clearly, "five logically distinct steps: (i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible solution; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief" (1910: 72).

The decisive feature of this account is that inquiry begins with something felt as difficult or perplexing, rather than with a clearly articulated problem. Dewey recognises that the difficulty may at first be vague and emotionally charged, and that it may not yet be located: "an undefined uneasiness and shock may come first, leading only later to definite attempt to find out what is the matter" (1910: 72). This is much closer to LVT's L2 than any conventional theory of rational deliberation, which typically begins with a decision problem already formulated.

The examples from which Dewey draws the analysis are worth noticing. A man in lower Manhattan sees a clock, realises that he has an appointment far uptown within the hour, and works out whether the subway or the elevated railway will get him there in time. A passenger on a ferryboat wonders what a long white pole projecting from the bow is for, and reasons his way to the answer that it shows the pilot the direction in which the boat is pointing. Someone washing tumblers in hot soapy water notices bubbles appearing on the outside of a glass and then moving inside it, and frames and tests a hypothesis about expanding and contracting air. Each case begins with a felt catch, and each catch is of a kind that can be stated, puzzled over and solved in words. Dewey chose his examples well for his purpose, and the choice already shows where his interest lies: in difficulties that become problems.

Dewey's steps are not rigidly sequential. He notes that the first and second steps frequently fuse into one, and his concern throughout is with the logical organisation of reflective activity rather than with a temporal succession of five separate mental events. LVT should not criticise him for a rigid stage model he never defended.

The pre-reflective and post-reflective situation (1933). The revised edition strengthens the overall pattern. Dewey now places reflective activity between two situations: at the beginning a perplexed, troubled or confused situation, and at the close a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (LW 8: 199–200). The phases of reflection are reorganised to match. Among them is what Dewey calls "an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been felt (directly experienced) into a problem to be solved" (LW 8: 200). The phrasing is precise and revealing. The felt difficulty is directly experienced; the problem is its intellectualisation.

Reflection, on this account, is measured by the transformation of the situation rather than valued as an end in itself. The correspondence with LVT's proposition that successful recursive work frequently allows a return to L1 is substantial. Dewey's post-reflective situation should not, however, simply be identified with L1, because it can retain newly acquired capacities, dispositions and conclusions. It is closer to what LVT would describe as an L1 that has been reorganised by prior recursive work and now carries its sediment.

From cognition to existential transformation (1938). In the Logic the comparison becomes closer still. Dewey insists that the indeterminate situation is no merely subjective state of uncertainty. The situation itself is unsettled in relation to an organism's activity and its possible consequences; we are doubtful because the situation is doubtful, and not the other way round. He also explicitly distinguishes the indeterminate situation from its subsequent identification as problematic. To call the initial situation problematic would be, he says, "proleptic and anticipatory", because "the indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry". Such situations come into existence from existential causes, like the organic imbalance of hunger, and "in themselves they are precognitive" (1938: 107).

Inquiry, furthermore, is more than thinking about the situation. It involves operations that transform its actual conditions, and its conclusion is warranted by the changed situation rather than by the coherence of an argument. This anticipates LVT's rejection of the assumption that living disturbances must first exist as symbolic representations before anything can be done about them.

Dewey also rejects an isolated conception of the organism. Organism and environment are integrated through ongoing living activity, and the Logic derives the pattern of inquiry from the more general pattern of life processes, through what he calls the biological and cultural matrices of inquiry. His account therefore already moves beyond many of the subject and object assumptions that LVT also challenges.

The strongest conclusion of the reconstruction. Dewey identified four indispensable features of recursive fluidity: ordinary coordination precedes inquiry; disturbance can be precognitive; reflection emerges within living activity; and successful inquiry restores workable coordination. This is no minor resemblance, since Dewey identified something profound about how living proceeds. The question is why his discovery remained a theory of inquiry rather than becoming an explicitly differentiated theory of recursive fluidity.

III. The Living Value Theory Alternative: Recursivity and Recursive Fluidity

Only the elements of Living Value Theory needed for the comparison are introduced here. The first is the distinction between recursivity and recursive fluidity. Recursivity is the condition in which the consequences of prior living mediation alter the conditions of subsequent mediation. Every living being is recursive in this sense, because what it has done and undergone becomes part of the conditions under which it continues. Recursive fluidity concerns the availability and organisation of different levels of recursive engagement within that continuing coordination.

LVT distinguishes five such levels. L1 is seamless living coordination. L2 is felt misalignment, a catch in coordination that need not be, and should not be imagined as, a hidden sentence. L3 is articulation, in which a difficulty or situation becomes available through symbolic formulation. L4 is stabilisation and decision, in which an articulation becomes settled enough to organise subsequent coordination. L5 is reflection on the adequacy of articulations, stabilisations and their conditions.

Four distinctions keep these levels from being misread. First, they identify different possibilities of recursivity within living coordination rather than stages of inquiry. Second, transitions between them are not necessarily sequential or unidirectional. A disturbance at L2 may return directly to L1; an L5 reconsideration may dissolve an L3 problem; an L4 decision may enable long stretches of L1 coordination. Third, not every disturbance requires L3 articulation, and not every successful resolution passes through a complete cycle of reflective inquiry. Fourth, different recursive engagements can coexist within the same continuously co-mediated living. A person may be absorbed in L5 philosophical reflection while walking, drinking tea and keeping pace with a companion in ways that remain almost entirely at L1.

The levels are also unevenly distributed across living beings. L1 and L2 belong to all living beings. Every organism coordinates seamlessly for most of its life, and every organism undergoes misalignments that it remediates without words, by moving, turning, withdrawing, approaching, resting or feeding. Articulation of problems in symbolic form, and the stabilisation and reflection that build upon it, are distinctively human, because they depend on an elaborated multisymbolization together with multimaterial means of inscribing and transmitting symbols. This distribution is central to the argument that follows.

The five mediations provide the ontological organisation within which these processes take place. In human living they are multisensorial embodiment, multispecies being-with, multiversal dwelling, multimateriality and multisymbolization. The first three are zoetic and shared, in their own forms, with other living beings; the last two are poietic and, in their elaborated forms, human. The mediations are the continuously co-constitutive conditions of living coordination, rather than additional stages or a background environment outside recursive fluidity, and none can be reduced to another.

Living Value Theory also distinguishes three types of recursive counterpart. A nonrecursive counterpart, such as a stone, a slope or a cool surface, does not alter in relation to the coordination it enters. A selfrecursive counterpart alters in relation to its own ongoing state, as a tired body does. An interrecursive counterpart responds to one's own responses, as another person or animal does. These differences matter because they shape which forms of recursive adjustment are available. A difficulty with a slope cannot be negotiated, and a difficulty with a companion cannot be climbed.

These elements yield a concise definition. Recursive fluidity is the continuing organisation of recursive engagement across the five levels, responsive to the changing conditions and vital stakes of living coordination. Unlike Deweyan inquiry, recursive fluidity need not begin with an indeterminate situation, and it need not culminate in a consciously established solution.

IV. The Remarkable Convergences: What Dewey Anticipated

Before the differences are developed, the shared ground should be stated clearly, and it is extensive.

The first convergence is ontological. Both approaches reject the picture of an autonomous mind confronting an external world and subsequently deciding how to act upon it. For Dewey, as for LVT, the unit of analysis is an ongoing process of living within which minds, objects and environments are distinguished, rather than a subject facing an object.

The second convergence is temporal. Living continuously inherits the consequences of earlier activity. Dewey's habits and adjustments, like LVT's recursive sedimentations, are intelligible only as phases of ongoing processes, never as fixed properties of agents.

The third convergence concerns precognitive difficulty. Both hold that consequential difficulties can precede their intellectual formulation, and that the formulation is a further achievement rather than the first moment of the difficulty.

The fourth convergence is practical. Inquiry and reflection matter because they transform conditions of living, and not merely because they produce representations. A conclusion that changes nothing has, for Dewey, failed as inquiry; for LVT, an articulation that does not alter coordination has not resolved the misalignment that called for it.

The fifth convergence is the positive significance of restored coordination. Dewey recognises that successful reflection can make reflection unnecessary again. The post-reflective situation is one in which activity can once more proceed without thought.

The sixth convergence is the provisional character of settlements. Inquiry, for Dewey, establishes no final, context-independent order that can never become questionable again. Warranted assertions are open to further inquiry, just as LVT's L4 stabilisations are always open to L5 reconsideration.

The seventh convergence is reflexive. Dewey explicitly studies the methods and conditions of inquiry itself. His Logic is, in effect, inquiry into inquiry.

There is also a broader convergence. Dewey's philosophy extends well beyond his formal account of inquiry. His theory of habit in Human Nature and Conduct treats acquired dispositions as the medium of nearly all conduct. In Art as Experience he develops an account of fulfilled, integrated experience, "an experience" in his emphatic sense, that includes ordinary activities such as a meal, a conversation or a piece of work brought to completion. It would therefore be wrong to claim that Dewey ignored ordinary successful coordination.

The contrast is subtler. It concerns how systematically each framework distinguishes its different recursive possibilities, and how each investigates their relations. What follows is no claim about Dewey's blindness, but a demonstration of the difference between an exceptionally rich account of inquiry and a systematic account of recursive fluidity.

V. First Decisive Difference: Inquiry Is One Possible Trajectory of Recursive Fluidity

Dewey's account is organised around the transformation of indeterminate situations through inquiry. Living Value Theory takes a wider starting point. Living coordination need not be disturbed in order to be theoretically interesting; it need not become explicitly problematic in order to undergo recursive adjustment; and its success need not be the outcome of inquiry. Three contrasts make this concrete.

Successful coordination without antecedent difficulty. Consider relaxed being-with, comfortable co-presence, or ordinary sleeping. Two people sit in the same room reading, each attending to a book, each aware of the other without attending to the other, and the shared quiet is itself a consequential coordination. Such coordination need not be understood as the solution to any particular difficulty. It depends on prior coordination, and it may depend on earlier acts of inquiry, and Dewey's wider philosophy can recognise this. But LVT treats the successful continuing organisation itself as a primary object. It asks how a living coordination works, which mediations sustain it, which counterparts participate, and which accumulated grounds make its continuation possible. A theory principally organised around problematic situations can leave much successful coordination comparatively unexamined, because there is no problem to reconstruct and no inquiry to report.

Remediation without articulation. This is the deepest difference between the two frameworks. A disturbance may be felt at L2 and remediated without ever reaching L3. A sleeper shifts position as an arm goes numb. Someone moves closer to the fire when the evening turns cold, or pulls a shawl tighter, before anyone has said that it is cold. A walker shortens their stride on a slippery path. A conversation partner softens their tone at the first sign of the other's discomfort. Each adjustment is consequential and recursive, because it alters the conditions of what follows, and none becomes a formulated problem.

Such remediations are by far the most common form of recursive adjustment in human life. For every difficulty that is articulated, discussed and resolved, countless others are felt and remediated without words, many of them during sleep. Nor are they distinctively human: a cat moves from shade to sun as the afternoon cools. A bird resettles its feathers in the wind. A grazing herd drifts away from a disturbance at its edge. All living beings coordinate predominantly at L1 and remediate misalignments at L2, through the three zoetic mediations of embodiment, being-with and dwelling, and they do so without any symbolic formulation of what is wrong. L2 remediation without articulation is the shared recursive ground of living as such.

Dewey's framework is heavily invested in problems that become articulated, and problems that become articulated are a human achievement. His five steps of 1910 move from a felt difficulty to its location and definition, to suggestion, reasoning and test; his reflective phases of 1933 turn on the intellectualisation of a felt difficulty into a problem to be solved; and his Logic holds that the indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry. In each case the felt difficulty matters chiefly as the beginning of a process that leads into articulation. Dewey does not deny non-intellectual organic adjustment. On the contrary, the Logic derives inquiry from the biological matrix of organic behaviour, in which organisms restore disturbed equilibria with their environments, and his principle of continuity holds that rational operations grow out of organic activities without being identical with them. But the biological matrix appears in the Logic as the matrix of inquiry, the ground from which inquiry emerges, and inquiry proper requires the cultural matrix of language and symbols. The organic adjustment that never becomes articulated is acknowledged as a precondition and then left behind.

The point can be made through the pattern Dewey himself takes as the biological model of inquiry. In the Logic, organic behaviour is described as a cycle of need, search and satisfaction, in which a disturbed relation between organism and environment issues in activity that restores an integrated relation. The description is apt, and it captures a great deal of L2 remediation. But it is presented as a prefiguration: what organisms do without symbols, humans do with them, and it is the doing with them that the Logic sets out to analyse. Living Value Theory would add two qualifications. First, the language of disturbed and restored equilibrium suggests that coordination is directed towards stability, whereas successful coordination yields relative stability without being for it. Second, the cycle describes only one trajectory of L2 remediation. Much remediation never completes a cycle of search and satisfaction at all, because the catch is too slight, the adjustment too immediate, or the misalignment absorbed by a change elsewhere in the coordination before any search begins.

LVT reverses this emphasis. It includes unarticulated L2 remediation in the same differentiated account as symbolic articulation and higher-order reflection, and it treats it as the more general case of which articulated inquiry is a later and rarer elaboration. The transition from L2 back to L1 is an ordinary possibility of living coordination in its own right, never a deficient or truncated version of inquiry. This reversal has consequences beyond emphasis. A theory that begins with inquiry will tend to measure intelligence by the capacity to articulate problems, and will find the most interesting cases where articulation is most elaborate. A theory that begins with recursive fluidity will find intelligence wherever coordination is responsively maintained, and will regard articulation as one resource among others, sometimes indispensable and sometimes a hindrance. It also places human inquiry within a continuum that includes every other living being, without needing a separate account of how intelligent behaviour emerges from mere organic adjustment.

Successful symbolic closure without successful living coordination. The third contrast is particularly powerful. An inquiry can produce a determinate conclusion; a problem can be declared solved; an institution can adopt a stable interpretation. Yet the underlying living misalignment may continue. LVT distinguishes the success of an articulation or stabilisation from its adequacy to the broader living coordination. The problem may have been formulated incorrectly. The solution may work for one participant and not for another. Its implementation may generate fresh disturbances in mediations the inquiry never considered. A household may resolve its argument about chores with a rota that settles the question at L4 while the felt imbalance at L2 persists, now without any legitimate means of articulation, because the matter has officially been settled.

Dewey himself insists that inquiry must transform actual situations rather than merely yield verbal conclusions, and this is a major protection against the objection. On his account, a rota that leaves the situation unsettled has not concluded the inquiry. But LVT can make the possible failures more explicit through its distinctions between levels and mediations, because it can say at which level closure has occurred, at which level misalignment persists, and which mediations and participants the closure has bypassed.

The central contrast can now be stated. For Dewey, the transformation of problematic situations provides a paradigmatic account of intelligent living. For LVT, such transformation is one distinctive organisation of recursive fluidity within living itself, a human elaboration of a far more general capacity shared by all living beings.

VI. Second Decisive Difference: Precognitive Indeterminacy and Felt Misalignment Are Not Automatically Identical

Dewey describes the initial indeterminate situation as precognitive. LVT identifies L2 as felt misalignment. These formulations are extremely close, but they do not necessarily identify the same phenomenon, and the difficulty deserves investigation rather than glossing.

Dewey insists that indeterminacy is a characteristic of the existential situation, and not merely of the individual's mental state. A situation may be unsettled before anyone has identified it as a problem. LVT's L2, by contrast, concerns a felt catch in living coordination. The critical question is how existential indeterminacy becomes felt misalignment, and this is where the difference between the two theories could become analytically fruitful.

An environmental condition may be variable or uncertain without producing any felt disturbance. The weather may be changeable all week while a household's coordination proceeds without a catch, because nothing that matters to it depends on the weather. Conversely, someone may experience an L2 misalignment in a situation whose practical conditions appear entirely stable to an outside observer, as when a familiar room suddenly feels wrong after a bereavement. What makes a situation consequential is its relation to a particular coordination and its vital stakes, rather than uncertainty in general. Dewey did not ignore practical stakes. His discussion of organism and environment, and of the consequences of activity, makes them central. But LVT can specify the relationship through the five mediations and through the ongoing organisation of recursive relevance, which determines what can become salient for whom.

Three questions follow for comparative analysis. What makes a condition a difficulty for a particular living being? At what point does that difficulty become available as felt misalignment? Under what conditions does it become an articulated problem requiring inquiry? These are not necessarily three moments of a single inevitable sequence. A condition may be consequential and never felt, as with a slow toxin; it may be felt and never articulated, as with most of the remediations described above; or it may be articulated without ever having been felt, as when an expert announces a risk that no one had experienced. The distinction between an existential condition, a felt disturbance and its symbolic problematisation becomes possible once the three are no longer treated as phases of one process.

The further point is that a felt misalignment does not validate its subsequent articulation. One may feel that something is wrong and explain it incorrectly, attributing a sleepless night to the meal rather than to the anxiety that preceded it. Equally, one may be supplied with an elaborate theoretical articulation that directs attention away from what is actually at stake, so that a real L2 misalignment is captured by an L3 account that obstructs its remediation. Dewey's own account of badly formulated problems recognises the first possibility. LVT's distinction between levels makes the second, the misleading articulation, a recurring configuration that can be studied in its own right, and it prepares the ground for a general account of recursive blockage.

Dewey's precognitive indeterminacy and LVT's L2 should therefore be closely compared and never simply equated. The comparison sharpens both: Dewey's emphasis on the existential situation prevents L2 from being collapsed into private feeling, and LVT's emphasis on felt misalignment asks for whom, and through which mediations, an indeterminate situation becomes a catch in living.

VII. Third Decisive Difference: L5, the Theorist, and the Limits of Inquiry into Inquiry

This difference connects the Dewey comparison to the wider programme on recursivity-level attribution, and it begins by rejecting an easy argument. It would be mistaken to claim that Dewey had no account of L5. His Logic defines logic through an investigation of inquiry itself: logical forms arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with its control, and the Logic examines the procedures through which warranted conclusions are established and the conditions under which those procedures can be judged adequate. That is a substantial anticipation of L5. The distinction must therefore concern the systematic position of L5 within each framework.

Reflection within inquiry and reflection upon inquiry. Dewey's phases of reflective thought include reasoning, hypothesis development and testing, but none of them corresponds automatically to LVT's L5. Testing a hypothesis is not the same as questioning the adequacy of the conceptual framework within which the hypothesis was formulated. Conversely, Dewey can and does undertake reflection on the conditions of inquiry itself, in the Logic and in his many essays on method. LVT makes it possible to distinguish these operations without conflating either with the fifth item in a sequence. It also allows for the possibility that the adequacy of an entire inquiry, including what counted as its original problem, may itself become questionable. An inquiry may be impeccably conducted and still have been the wrong inquiry, because the problem it took up was a misleading articulation of a different misalignment.

L5 as an ordinary human possibility. Recursivity-level attribution asks which recursive capacities a theory recognises in the people it describes. Does Dewey reserve the capacity for higher-order reflection to philosophers and scientific experts? His educational commitments suggest otherwise. How We Think treats reflective inquiry as a human capacity that education should cultivate in every child, and his wider democratic philosophy challenges claims to permanent epistemological privilege, including those of experts. Dewey may therefore offer a quite different L5 attribution profile from Bourdieu, whose distinction between practical sense and the sociologist's objectifying position constructs a far more pronounced asymmetry between participants and theorist. The comparison should not assume that Dewey grants everyone identical competence in every form of inquiry. The relevant distinction is between the general availability of a recursive capacity and the historically unequal conditions under which that capacity can be developed and exercised, and on this distinction Dewey's position is unusually clear.

Does Deweyan inquiry recognise its own characteristic blockages? Dewey is highly attentive to badly formulated problems, premature conclusions and defective methods of reasoning. LVT allows a further question. Can the commitment to treating living disturbances as problems for inquiry itself become an inappropriate L4 stabilisation? Might some difficulties be generated by the expectation that experience must be articulated, investigated and resolved, as when a disturbed night is turned into a sleep problem that must be monitored, measured and solved, and the monitoring itself keeps sleep from returning? And might some successful forms of living be misunderstood because they have no inquiry to report?

These questions are less a criticism of Dewey than an L5 question posed to the organising assumptions of his framework. The same question applies to Living Value Theory. Does its emphasis on recursive fluidity illuminate something consequential, or does it merely redescribe every phenomenon in its preferred vocabulary? A framework that has made recursive fluidity its central object may stabilise that object as prematurely as any other. The comparison can demonstrate L5 reflection only by questioning the adequacy of both theories' starting points, and it must accept that the questioning may tell against LVT as readily as against Dewey.

VIII. Fourth Decisive Difference: From Organism-Environment Transactions to Multimediational Living Coordination

The deepest ontological comparison concerns Dewey's account of organism and environment. That account is already relational, temporal, practical and anti-dualist. It would be mistaken to characterise the environment in Dewey as an external collection of influences acting upon an otherwise independent organism. From his early critique of the reflex arc to the Logic and the later work with Arthur Bentley on transaction, Dewey rejected the assumption that organism and environment begin as independent entities that are subsequently connected by interaction. The question is therefore what the five mediations add.

Differentiating the organisation of living. LVT identifies multisensorial embodiment, multispecies being-with, multiversal dwelling, multimateriality and multisymbolization as irreducible mediations of human living coordination. Dewey's philosophy addresses the relationships among bodily activity, environment, social life, artefacts and symbols, often with great subtlety. But he does not organise them through any comparable architecture, and the environment of the Logic is divided chiefly into a biological and a cultural matrix. The LVT contribution is to make the distinct but continuously co-constitutive roles of the mediations available for systematic comparison, rather than simply to notice elements that Dewey ignored. It can ask, of any situation, in which mediation a misalignment opened, through which mediations it was remediated, and which mediations an inquiry took into account.

The division into biological and cultural matrices also reproduces, in a softened form, the distribution criticised in the previous sections. The biological matrix is where organic adjustment happens; the cultural matrix is where inquiry happens. LVT's architecture cuts differently. The zoetic mediations are shared by all living beings, but they are fully present in human living too, and human L2 remediation through embodiment, being-with and dwelling is no mere biological residue beneath a cultural surface. A person who moves closer to the fire is remediating through the same mediations as the cat moving into the sun, and also through a made hearth, a shared room and an expectation about who sits where. The mediations are co-present rather than layered.

Distinguishing recursive counterparts. Dewey's account of organic activity and social interaction recognises that different environments offer different possibilities of response. LVT adds an explicit distinction between nonrecursive, selfrecursive and interrecursive counterparts. Consider a person trying to sleep. The temperature of the room, the person's own bodily state and the responsiveness of a partner in the same bed involve different kinds of coordination. A cool surface does not answer back. A tired body responds recursively to its own changing condition, so that the effort to fall asleep can itself keep sleep away. Another person can anticipate, resist or adjust to the sleeper's movements, so that a turn in the night may be met by a corresponding turn. These differences affect the possibilities of recursive fluidity, because not all disturbances can be resolved through the same kind of adjustment.

The distribution of recursive burden. The mediations and counterpart types also make possible an analysis of who bears the work of keeping coordination seamless. One person's L1 may depend on another person's continued vigilance. A household, institution or workplace may appear smoothly coordinated because difficulties have been transferred to people whose disturbances remain unrecognised: the parent who listens for the child at night, the worker on the night shift, the person who always notices what is running low. Dewey's social philosophy can certainly investigate unequal conditions and conflicting interests. The distinctive LVT question is whether the distribution of recursive burden can be reconstructed systematically across the mediations and counterpart types. That is a possible gain in explanatory precision, and no claim that Dewey lacked any concern with power.

IX. A Comparative Empirical Demonstration: A Night of Kali Puja in West Bengal

The comparison can be tested on a concrete case drawn from my own fieldwork in West Bengal. Sleep is a privileged object for investigating successful but muted living coordination, and a night of Kali Puja is especially suitable because it contains both successful coordination and considerable disturbance, but does not organise itself around any single clearly defined problem of inquiry.

Kali Puja falls on the new-moon night of the month of Kartik. In the village household where I spent it, the ritual ran from about midnight until close to dawn. A drummer, visibly exhausted well before the end, played through most of the night. Children ran about lighting firecrackers between the more solemn parts of the ceremony. An uncle told a long run of jokes that kept people awake through the later hours. Some members of the family did not sleep at all. Others napped during the quieter stretches, leaning against a wall or dozing upright for twenty minutes or so before the chanting or the drumming resumed. After the ceremony and a meal, Mangla-di found me a bed in the living room at first light, and I slept until nine.

A Deweyan reading. Dewey's framework directs attention to how participants respond to the demands of prolonged wakefulness, how fatigue is encountered and managed, and how existing patterns of activity are modified so that ritual participation can continue. One could examine the practical experimentation through which people find workable responses: the uncle's jokes as a means of sustaining attention, the brief naps as a solution to exhaustion, the alternation between solemnity and play as a way of keeping the night going, and the eventual return to sleep once the ritual had been brought to completion. Dewey's emphasis on doing and undergoing, and on intelligent adjustment within a changing situation, gives a rich account of these responses. His aesthetic theory adds something further, since the night as a whole could be read as an experience in his emphatic sense, a course of activity carried to its fulfilment.

An LVT reading. The analysis begins by reconstructing the distribution of recursivity levels across the participants. Much of the night proceeded seamlessly: the sequence of the ritual, the placing of bodies, the movement between rooms. Fatigue became an L2 disturbance for some participants and not for others, and for the drummer it became pressing long before it did for anyone else. Most of the disturbances were remediated without articulation. Nobody announced that they would now sleep against the wall; they simply did, and woke when the drumming resumed. Other difficulties did become matters of explicit discussion, practical decision or ritual obligation, as when the timing of the ceremony determined who could rest and when, or when Mangla-di decided where the guest would sleep. Different participants had different possibilities of recursive opening and closure.

The five mediations can then be reconstructed. Embodiment includes fatigue, dozing and recovery, and the drummer's exhausted arms. Being-with includes mutual expectations, hospitality, care and the shared work of keeping a ritual going, of which the uncle's jokes were a part, as were the children's firecrackers in another key. Dwelling includes the darkness of the new-moon night, the season and the slow approach of dawn, which set the ritual's limits. Multimateriality includes the walls that could be leaned against, the drum, the firecrackers and the bed that was found at first light. Multisymbolization includes the ritual's organisation, its prescriptions and its interpretations, which established that the night was to be kept and by whom.

Finally, the distribution of recursive burden can be examined. Who could sleep, who could not, and whose continued activity made the coordinated night possible? The drummer could not stop while the ritual required drumming. Those who did not sleep at all held the ceremony together for those who dozed. Mangla-di, at the end of a night in which she had also taken part, carried the work of finding the guest a place to sleep. The seamless rest of some depended on the sustained L2 engagement of others.

What the comparison demonstrates. The comparison does not show that Dewey is incapable of understanding the ritual, but that each framework makes something especially investigable. Dewey is particularly strong when reconstructing intelligent adjustment within a changing situation, and his account of consummatory experience captures the night's shape as a whole. LVT can investigate how successful living coordination continued across many participants and mediations, including where no inquiry was undertaken or needed. Its most distinctive gain lies exactly where Dewey's account is thinnest: the dozing against the wall, the waking to the drum, the countless small remediations that were felt and resolved without ever becoming problems, which were the night's ordinary fabric and which any other living being keeping watch through a long night would share in its own way. The comparison provides a concrete test of explanatory gain.

X. From Dewey to a Comparative Research Programme

The comparison can be generalised into a method without attempting a complete history of ideas. Recursivity-level profiling asks which levels a theory substantively theorises, which it presupposes, which transitions it explains, which blockages it identifies and what it counts as resolution. Dewey provides a particularly revealing profile. His work foregrounds successful ordinary coordination as the antecedent and the consequence of inquiry, gives exceptionally detailed attention to the movement from disturbance through articulation to transformation, and explicitly undertakes higher-order inquiry into inquiry. His accounts of habit and of aesthetic experience substantially broaden the profile. Yet he does not distinguish the five recursivity levels as a general architecture of living coordination, and the L2 remediation that never becomes articulated appears in his work chiefly as the organic precondition of inquiry. This profile can then be compared with those of Marx, Bourdieu, Wittgenstein, Maslow and others.

Recursivity-level attribution is a separate procedure. It investigates who is recognised as capable of examining the adequacy of existing interpretations, including those supplied by experts. Dewey offers a productive contrast with theories that construct more pronounced asymmetries between ordinary practical knowledge and theoretical understanding. Attribution can also be extended beyond the human. A theory that locates intelligence in articulated inquiry attributes very little to other living beings; a theory that locates recursive fluidity in L1 and L2 attributes a great deal, while still marking clearly what articulation adds.

The Dewey comparison also suggests where the strongest empirical claims of Living Value Theory are likely to lie. If Dewey already offers much of the general picture of recursive movement, the most distinctive contribution may not consist in describing movement from L1 through L5 and back again. It may lie in explaining why recursive opening occurs in one mediation rather than another, why one form of recursive engagement obstructs another, why most disturbances never become articulated and do not need to, and why the success of one living coordination can depend on the continuing recursive burden of another. These are questions that move the argument from a comparison of philosophical descriptions towards empirical research, and the night of Kali Puja shows that ethnography of sleep is unusually well placed to pursue them.

Three research directions follow. The first is systematic comparative intellectual history, using recursivity-level profiling across philosophical and social-scientific traditions. The second is empirical mesocosmography of recursive fluidity, particularly in situations where successful coordination produces little explicit articulation, of which sleep, eating and relaxed co-presence are the most important. The third is comparative analysis of recursive blockage, including cases in which apparently successful inquiries fail to resolve the underlying living difficulties.

The programme must also state what would count as a limitation or failure of the LVT approach. If recursivity profiling produces only new names for existing descriptions, it has demonstrated little. If it cannot identify consequences, omissions or explanatory distinctions unavailable in the original framework, its comparative value remains unproven. And if an earlier theory already identifies the full organisation of recursive fluidity, the historical originality claim would have to be revised. Dewey is the most serious candidate yet examined, and the comparison should be repeated by others who know his work better than any single reader can. These conditions are strengths of a research programme that is open to correction, rather than concessions that weaken it.

XI. Conclusion: Dewey's Inquiry within Recursive Living

Dewey identified something fundamental about how living coordination becomes disturbed, reflectively transformed and restored, and his achievement should be understood as one of the most powerful anticipations of recursive fluidity. Yet inquiry does not exhaust the recursive organisation of living. Living coordination also involves seamless continuation, felt disturbances that never become articulated, remediation without symbols, misleading stabilisations, recursive reopening and differently distributed possibilities of reflection. Above all, it involves the vast field of L2 remediation without articulation that humans share with every other living being. LVT makes these possibilities distinguishable within a general account of living coordination. Its contribution is the identification of a wider phenomenon within which Deweyan inquiry can be situated, compared with other forms of recursive activity, and investigated alongside the theories that have attempted to explain it, rather than the replacement of Dewey's theory. Inquiry is one of the achievements of recursive fluidity, and recursive fluidity is far more than another name for inquiry.

Selected References

Dewey, John. 1896. "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." Psychological Review 3 (4): 357–370.

Dewey, John. 1910. How We Think. Boston: D. C. Heath.

Dewey, John. 1922. Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology. New York: Henry Holt.

Dewey, John. 1933. How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process. Boston: D. C. Heath. Reprinted in The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 8, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.

Dewey, John. 1934. Art as Experience. New York: Minton, Balch.

Dewey, John. 1938. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt. Reprinted in The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 12, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.

Dewey, John, and Arthur F. Bentley. 1949. Knowing and the Known. Boston: Beacon Press.